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Preface 
The unauthorized use of force in Iraq by the coalition forces and the establishment 
of a transitional authority following the occupation of Iraq by the occupying powers 
raised serious concerns for the appearance of legitimacy under international law. As 
scholars have called this period of uncertainty 'cross roads' 1, this event calls for a precise 
legal analysis. As a student of International Law I find it irresistible to undertake an in-
depth research on this phenomenon. I shall to this end conduct and present a thorough 
investigation of the Transitional Authority in Iraq, its legitimacy, governance and seek to 
identify potential contribution to the progressive development of international law in this 
field. 
Besides, my personal interest in the Iraqi events played a role in selecting this 
topic. Freedom, war, and democracy- these words have simply been integral part of my 
regular life as I was growing up in Bangladesh. The fact of being the first generation of a 
new country came with its demands. I witnessed nostalgia about the freedom struggle, 
survival stories during the war, almost fifteen years of military dictatorship and uprising 
and sacrifice of common people for democracy. The ordeal of Iraqi people and the future 
of this vibrant culture attracted me to study their journey to a new political reality. My 
two and half years' stay in the Middle East has played a role in deciding to work with this 
subject. 
By any standard, this is as sensitive a political topic as it is a legal one. Though I 
tried to analyze without partisan bias, at times I have taken sides. As one of the most 
1 
Sompong Sucharitkul, International law at the crossroads, 13th Regional Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law, March 12, 2004, San Francisco. 
2 
influential historians in the US Howard Zinn wrote, "You can't be neutral on a moving 
train" - I did not try to be one. I have voiced my support for the law above everything else. 
It is my great pleasure to thank the members of my committee; my advisors 
Professor Christian Okeke and Professor Michael Van Walt for their support and 
inspiration over the years. I am indebted to my Supervisor Distinguished Professor 
Sompong Sucharitkul for his endless contribution to this work as well as my 
understanding of international law in general. 
My heartfelt thanks go to John Pluebell of GGU International Student 
Services for his ever smiling helpfulness. My deepest appreciation for all my friends in 
the Bay Area who helped me survives spiritually. And last but not the least I thank the 
most favorite men in my life -my brother Kamrul Hassan, spouse Pablo Barua and my 
two month young son Duronto Pablo, without whom I might have given up a long time 
ago. 
I hope this dissertation contributes to the growing study of transitional 
authorities in international law. This work has been my love made visible (As put by 
Kahlil Gibran) and I wish to continue my efforts in this regard. 
3 
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Chapter I 
Transitional Authority in International Law and the 
Relevance of the Iraqi Case 
6 
Introduction: 
'Transitional Authority' can be described as one of the most recent phenomenon 
in international law. It is the authority, exercised by a party other than the legitimate 
sovereign, over a territory for a limited period of time. In the absence of a formal 
definition, precedence could be considered as providing the mandate of the authority. 
Thus it can be accurately defined as 'the unique legitimate body and source of authority 
in which throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity' of 
the territory in question 'are enshrined,2 as well as the administrative body which is 
'empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority including the 
administration of justice,3.From the definition arises a two fold characteristic of a 
transitional Authority namely, its temporary nature during a transitional period and its 
exercise of sovereign authorities and discharge of corresponding responsibilities. The 
Transitional period may have been the result of an internal conflict or an international 
intervention; international law has not crystallized a specific set of rules in this regard and 
merely prescribes the necessary authority on a case-by-case basis. In this crucial period of 
progressive development of international law in the area of transitional authority, the 
world has witnessed an unprecedented situation in Iraq, which through the acts of 
bringing about the interim government challenges the sovereign equality of States 
assured by the United Nations. The unauthorized use of force was condemned by the 
United Nations despite the promise of cooperation for rebuilding the nation. 
Subsequently -the UN has authorized the Transitional A~thority and joined the efforts to 
reinstate a permanent governing body. The Legitimacy and authority of this Transitional 
2 
3 SC Resolution 745 (1992) establishing United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. 
SC Resolution 1272 (1999) establishing United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. 
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Government in Iraq as well as its contribution to the development of international law 
will be examined in this study. 
Though there is no codification of the rules of governance by the United Nations 
or other international bodies, international law has come a long way to confront and 
manage conflict situations. The colonial rules have mostly ended 4 before international 
law was institutionalized through the formation of the United Nations in 1945. Thus 
formally the UN never encountered the clashes of sovereignty issues. Though the UN 
Charter establishes 'sovereign equality of all its Members,5, it has permitted deviation 
from the principle of non-interference in times of extraordinary events and to act 
accordingll. Prior to the end of the Cold War, The United Nations had frequently been 
involved in the monitoring of borders and cease-fires as well as conducting or monitoring 
the process of elections. The UN also assumed responsibility for the territories, (detached 
from enemy States as a result of World War IT), previously under the mandate of the 
League of the Nations in accordance with the Trusteeship system7• Authorized by chapter 
XIT of the Charter, it administered Irian Jaya (western New Guinea) for seven months 
during the transition from Dutch colonial rule to Indonesian control in 1962-1963 
pursuant to an agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands8. The UN also asserted 
the right to govern Namibia when the General Assembly terminated the trusteeship of 
South, a mandate established under the League of Nations and provided to set up a 
council for Namibia for governing purposes9. 
: With few exceptions like Hong Kong, Puerto Rico, Samoa etc 
6 Article 2.1 of the UN Charter 
Article 39-51 of the UN Charter 
7 Art. 
8 rcle 75-85 of the UN Charter 
9 Agreement concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), Aug 15, 1962, Indo.-Neth., 437 UNTS 274 
GA Res. 2248, UN GAOR, 5th Spec. Sess., Supp No 1, at 1, UN Doc. A16657 (1967) 
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Since the end of the Cold War a decade or two ago, there has been tremendous 
development in the UN as a global organization exercising authority in a number of new 
ways to address conflict situations and to cope with their consequences. These new 
measures came in the form of the use of force to end interstate and internal violence1o 
such as in the case of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, intervention 
in Haiti in 1990, protection of civilians in Rwanda in 1994; and enforcement of Dayton 
Accords in the Former Yugoslavia in 1995. The UN stepped forward to resolve boundary 
issues between Iraq and Kuwait in 1991 11 as well as to create international criminal 
tribunals for former Yugoslavia in 199312 and for Rwanda in 199413 in order to prosecute 
violations of international humanitarian law. Compensation for victims of Persian Gulf 
conflict has also caught international attention 14. However authoritative these measures 
may have been, they were not governing acts or governance in the true sense of the word. 
The first major UN exercise in governance came with the formation of the UN 
Transitory Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) , an institution created by the 1991 
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement ofthe Conflict in Cambodia15. There 
was also the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) created "under 
United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences,,16. The mission of 
10 SC Res.678, UN SCOR, 45 th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 27, UN Doc. SIINF/46 (1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 
1565 (1990) ; SC Res. 929, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 10, UN Doc. SIINF/50 (1994);SC 
Res.940, id at 51; SC Res. 1031 UN SCOR, 50th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 18,UN Doc. SIINF/51 (1995), 
r~printed in 35 ILM 251 (1996) . 
. SC Res. 687, UN SCOR, 46th Sess., Res. &Dec., at 11, paras. 2-4, UN DOC. SIINF/47 (1991), reprinted 
!~ 30 ILM 847 (1991). 
SC Res. 827, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 29, UN Doc. SIINF/49 (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 
~203 (1993). 
14 SC Res. 955, UN SCOR, 49 th Sess., supra note 1 at 15, reprinted in 33 ILM 1602 (1994). 
SC Res. 687, supra note 7, paras. 16-19, 
15 
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct 23, 1991, Art. 6 & 
~nnex1, 31 ILM 183, 184 (1992). 
SC Res. 1244 (1999). 
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the international civil presence was unprecedented in scope and complexityl? and it ended 
the reluctance of the UN to assume governing responsibilities in conflict stricken 
territories. Within months of the advent of the UNMIK, the UN Security Council faced 
Ie) 
an emergency situation in East Timor encouraging the formation~r;nother institution of a 
similar kind. Thus, the Security Council established the UN Transitional Administration 
in East Timor (UNT AET), with "overall responsibility for the administration of East 
Timor", empowered "to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the 
administration of justice"l8. In Afghanistan, the world has witnessed yet another more 
matured Transitional Authority brought about by the international community after using 
force under the guise of the principle of State responsibilityl9. 
This gradual development of the principle and practice of the 'Transitional 
Authority' in international law raises many legal questions on the face of it. Whether 
there is in fact adequate legal authority for UN actions in such cases. It is unclear whether 
UN has the necessary legal authority to assume the character and scope of the governance 
functions it has assumed. The exercise of governance may represent an impermissible 
interference with State sovereignty. 20 The institution of an authority in Iraq has further 
complicated the issue. There arises further query as to whether the transitional authority 
created by an occupying force can operate with undoubted validity in conformity with 
international norms. It is difficult to justify such an institution on the notion of 
sovereignty. It is difficult to define the role of the UN in this situation. The suffice of this 
dissertation is to dissect the 'Fransitional Authority in Iraq, examine its legitimacy and 
17 M. h 18 Ie ael Matheson, United Nations Governance of Post conflict Societies, 95 Am. J. Int'l. L. 79 (2001). 
19 SC Res. 1272 (1999). 
20 http://www.state.gov/p/salris/6675.htm 
Supra note 17 at 84. 
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governance and seek to identify its contribution to the growing jurisprudence of 
international law . 
The degree or extent of the jurisdiction or sovereign authority of the Transitional 
Authorities is a pressing issue for discussion. Traditionally the mandates of TA has 
included the duty of maintaining law and order, to establish effective administration, 
rehabilitation of the infra structure as well as to oversee all aspects of Human Rights 
improvement. The central question of post conflict societies, however, remains political: 
how to best construct a stable form of democratic institution complete with the ideal 
power sharing and governance21 • There is no unanimous support for any particular 
ideology, though democracy has the strongest force of the whole world behind it. 
Economically successful nations and international instruments speak in unison highly of 
democracy. This favorable image is further demonstrated by public opinion allover the 
world. But the next question is whether democracy, with its proper foundation, is in 
reality the most viable option for governing a conflict stricken society. It is not clear how 
far the TA should have the authority to prescribe any given blend of democracy for the 
regime? Especially in the case of Iraq, despite its autocratic system, where the conflict 
was not brought about by the ruling party itself, it is not at all convincing that an interim 
authority should be empowered to make fundamental changes in the political structure of 
a country. Again, the fear of destabilization by democracy itself can not be ignored. 
History suggests from the experiences of Burundi, former Yugoslavia and Germany that 
elites may rally ethnic sentiment or use ethnic violence to retain power when threatened 
21 
Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Post conflict Societies, 95 Am. J. Int'1. 
L. 86 (2001). 
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by democratic changes22. Considering the possibilities, it is the purpose of this study to 
endeavor to identify and suggest the path for the Transitional Authority has followed in 
this respect. 
Addressing the root causes of conflict within the society and attending to HR 
violations rank among the more important tasks of the interim Government. To add to the 
criminal prosecutions of the responsible offenders, the UN introduced Truth 
Commissions to accelerate the healing process of a troubled nation. As the case of Iraq is 
fundamentally different from any other situation of this kind, it is questionable whether 
the judicial process be any different or should not. A question is raised whether an 
international tribunal would not be more suitable for a country's ruler where the 
neutrality of the trying court is in doubt. History of international law and practice does 
not appear to support any such prosecution of a head of State merely with respect to 
crimes committed within its territorial constraint. It might have been wiser to have this 
prosecution delayed until a regular government is restored in Iraq. 
Perhaps the most complex and laborious agenda on T A's hand is one of social 
reform. Since every situation has its unique history and consequences, the code of 
conduct must be crafted creatively. The local capacities for change and international 
commitment to assist the process must be determined first. Religious, ethnic and minority 
issues are very sensitive; they should as such be handled with much care and 
sophistication. Above all, strategies should be designed to address the case in hand. 
Bearing the rare stigma of secularism in the Middle East, it is difficult to imagine how 
Iraq would survive the struggle for religious supremacy III the absence of a secular 
22 
Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and the Danger a/War, lnt'! Security, Summer 
1995 at 5. 
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identity. Did the TA bow to popular demand rather than implementing international 
standard is another issue at hand? 
It is high time to evaluate the gender issue in peace-keeping force according to the 
explanation of the Economic and Social Council- "Women's equal participation in all 
aspects of peace processes and attention to gender issues in such processes have been an 
important focus of international action, especially since the Fourth World Conference orr 
Women and the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action (1995)".23Gender issues in 
post conflict territories cover two aspects- women's equal participation in peace building 
and ensuring gender equality in all segments of society. Complaints of violence against 
women by the peacekeeping troops must be heard and treated with seriousness. Prison 
abuses by the occupying forces in Iraq, for example, must be examined under the 
provisions of international instruments. Encountering the gender issue in particular is yet 
another challenge for the T A. It is important to find out whether the previous T As has 
strictly followed the international guidelines for empowering women. In particular an 
examination will be made regarding East Timor as well as Afghanistan, whether the T A 
has launched legislate rules to secure women's participation and equal status in all walks 
of the society and ultimately by way of comparison the TA in Iraq is coping with the 
'woman question' in a structure where democracy might empower the conservative 
Muslims over secular forces. In short, it is the object of the present study to ascertain the 




To sum up, this work is intended to accomplish a number of objectives, including, among 
others-
1. An analyses, syntheses and examination In depth of all the international 
instruments relating the to formation of a Transitional Authority, the extent of its 
authority and the ecologies of effective authority. 
2. A Description of the foundation, legality and procedures undertaken by the Iraqi 
Transitional Authority; provision of a critical analysis of the same. 
3. A Suggestion of ways and means of implementation, compliance and enforcement 
of existing international norms related to Transitional Authorities and recommend 
modes of developing the jurisprudence in this area of law. 
As the study demands, this dissertation builds on international legislations, mostly 
resolutions, treaties, judicial decisions, commentaries, interviews with scholars in 
different fields as well as domestic legislations on the subject of T A. The W orId Wide 
Web has been especially helpful in the research. This work will be divided into sIX 
chapters. 
After setting this agenda in Chapter one, Chapter two will discuss the formation 
of the T A for Iraq and the Legal consequences arising therefore. I will discuss the 
dilemma of unauthorized use of force in this case, international condemnation and 
realization of the necessity of international commitment to rebuild this territory. The 
political concern regarding the T A being set up by the Coalition Provisional Authority 
rather than the United Nations is another point of consideration in this chapter. As I look 
into the scope of authority of the CPA, Governing Council, Interim Administration and 
14 
Transitional Government- together forming the Transitional Authority in Iraq, I answer 
four specific questions. First, did the coalition have legal authority to go into Iraq and 
overthrow the government, which required installing of a transitional administration? 
Second, did the occupying force have legal authority for the character and governance 
functions it had assumed? Third, Did the Transitional authority govern within its scope 
and limits allowed by international law? Fourth, what effect if any does this temporary 
government have over the principle of sovereignty under international law . 
In Chapter three, the research will focus on one of the most critical issues for the 
TA; drafting a permanent constitution. I will analyze, document and examine the issues 
relating to the constitution making process and the content of this constitution. I will 
argue in this part that the constitution making process did not satisfy international 
standards and a practical approach where the content neglected to identify common 
strategies to unify a diverse community. 
In Chapter four I will talk about the gender role in rebuilding a society through 
T A. The main points for discussion in this chapter are Iraqi legal infrastructure affecting 
women, gender sensitivity in the society and participation of women in political as well 
as social decision-making. I draw a comparative picture of the situation of women both 
under the previous regime and under the T A. Supporting my argument I demonstrate that 
women's status during the T A and present government influenced by the constitution 
drafted by the T A suffered a major setback compared to the previous autocratic 
government. -
Chapter five deals with another important aspect of post conflict nation building-
establishing rule of law. Describing international trends for post conflict justice, I analyze 
15 
two aspects of Iraqi T A efforts- establishing Special Tribunal for trying previous 
government's violation of human rights and reconstructing the Iraqi legal system. In this 
chapter I argue that though milestones regarding criminal liability of heads of state have 
been reached, the special tribunal as well as the reconstruction effort falls short of 
international legal standards. 
Chapter six is a compilation of all my arguments, development of jurisprudence in 
this area of law and recommendation to further enhance the international commitment in 
this regard. I will argue that this is high time to enact a complete set of rules with regard 
to Transitional Authority and set the limit to the virtually unrestricted broad exercise of 
authority. Consequences of violations of the law will be suggested. Even though 
international cooperation is needed to rebuild Iraq, the unauthorized act of the use of 
force must bear adequate condemnation and the T A should always confirm to 
international (In other words UN) standards in all actions and at all times. 
16 
Chapter II 
Transitional Authority in Iraq: Legitimacy and Governance 
17 
Introduction: 
"1 will give you a talisman. Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self becomes too 
much with you, apply the following test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest 
man [woman] whom you may have seen, and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is 
going to be of any use to him [her]. Will he [she] gain anything by it? Will it restore him 
[her] to a control over his [her] own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to 
swara] [freedom] for the hungry and spiritually starving millions? 
Then you will find your doubts and your self melt away. ,,24 
[M K Gandhi, 1948] 
In a world that Gandhi, one of the greatest leaders of twentieth century envisioned 
freedom benefits the marginalized group of the society; in today's reality, however, it 
seems to be about political choices, free market economy and agendas of business 
entities. 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' was such an undertaking where an internationally 
mandated occupying force assumed the role of Transitional Authority (T A) in Iraq and 
offered massive economic and structural reconstruction without much regard to the 
common people's interest in basic needs. 
The T A in Iraq was installed after the Government of Iraq was ousted in a 
preemptive self defense by a coalition force led by the United States. The coalition was 
publicized to consist of 49 countries including UK, Japan, Italy, Spain, Turkey, 
Philippines and Poland. Whereas the majority of the troops were from the US, many 
countries sent token appearances, medical teams and personnel in other capacities instead 
of soldiers. Even they were reportedly 'often sent (them) in response to US arm-twisting, 
;-----------------
Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. II (1958) p 65 retrieved from www.mkgandhi.orglgquots on April 6, 2007 
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to carry favor with the world's only superpower or to gain access to Iraqi Oil,25. As if to 
prove the fragility of the coalition, within a year many countries began to pull out 
whatever personnel they provided26. Heated debates on the legality of the use of force 
still exist among international law practitioners27• Though the question of legality found 
no satisfactory closure from the international legal scholars, the coalition became de facto 
sovereign of Iraq and with UN mandate began to exercise authority as occupying force. 
Before returning sovereignty to a democratically elected government, the occupying 
power Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), Interim 
Government (IG) and Transitional Administration (TAd) governed Iraq in the capacity of 
temporary government. These four institutions governed Iraq from May 2003 to 2006 and 
form the Transitional Authority of Iraq. In my endeavor to analyze governance of Iraq 
during this period, I look for the answers to the following questions raised by the 
developments of events: 
First, did the coalition have legal authority to go into Iraq and overthrow the 
government, which required installing of a transitional administration? 
25 Global Policy Forum, Iraq Program, retrieved from 
~ttp://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/irgindx.htm (Last visited on April 8, 2007) 
6 C . ountrles including Japan, Italy, Spain, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Poland, Costa Rica, Philippines, 
~onduras, Dominican Republic have pulled their personnel out of Iraq. 
For a complete discussion of the Use of Force in Iraq see Mahmoud Hamoud, The Use of Force against 
Ira~: Occupation and Security Council Resolution 148336 Cornell InCl. L. J (435-454) 2003-2004; 
Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Preemptive Use offorce: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and 
Iraq 4 San Diego InCl L. J. (7-38)2003; Patrick McLain, Settling the score with Saddam: Resolution 1441 
~nd Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force against Iraq 13 Duke J. Compo & InCl L. (233-292) 2003; 
e~ Saul, The Legality of the Use of Force against Iraq in 2003: Did the coalition defend or defy ihe-
~~lted Nations? 8 UCLA J. InCl. L. &Foreign Affairs (267-330) 2003; Nikolaos Tsagourias, The 
Dlcaragua Case and the Use of Force: The Theoretical Construction of the Decision and its 
B~o~struction 1 J. Armed Conflict L. (81-1 ~ 1~ 1996; John C. Yoo & ':"ill Tra~hman, ~ess than 
394 gained for: The Use of Force and the DeclImng Relevance of the Umted NatIOns 5 ChI. J. InCl. L. (379-
.. Pro).2??4-2005; Edward McWhinney, The USlBritish Invasion of Iraq and the United Nations Charter 
.. 200~bltIon of the Use of Force: The Paradox of Unintended Consequences 2 Chinese J. InCl. L. (571-586) 
19 
Second, did the occupying force have legal authority for the character and 
governance functions it had assumed? 
Third, did the Transitional authority govern within its scope and limits allowed by 
international law? 
Fourth, how did the transitional authority affect the existing sovereignty 
principle? 
Iraq: Cradle of Civilizations 
"It's the place where we get the first cities, the first writing, the first thoughts 
about what's man's relationship to God. It's the first sort of ideas about death. It's the 
first recorded literature that we have ".28 
Today's Iraq does not represent that place anymore. Now it's a land of death 
waiting at different corners in the guise of suicide bombers. It is hard to believe that the 
land where the earliest code Hammurabi29 emerged has now become one of the most 
lawless countries on earth. Known, as the cradle of several civilizations Iraq's history is 
one of dominating rulers and repressed peoples30. Before becoming the part of the 
Turkish Ottoman Empire in 1 i h Century, Iraq was governed by Sumerians, Babylonians, 
Chaldeans, and Persian and Arab rulers. After the First World War Iraq became a British 
mandate under the League of Nations and in 1932 became independent. Independent Iraq 
28 
McGuire Gibson, Professor of Mesopotamian Archeology at the University of Chicago commented on 
Morning Edition of National Public Radio, Feb 20 2003. Retrieved from 
~:I/www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld-978050 
II The Code of Hammurabi is one of the earliest codified laws in the world. It was created in 1760 by King 
30 ammurabi of Babylon. For complete text of the code see http://www.wsu.edu/-dee/MESO/CODE.HTM 
For complete History of Iraq see George Roux, Ancient Iraq 1992. 
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suffered under British mandated monarchy only to be overthrown by military in 1958. 
This regime change was followed by two other Baathist coups in 1963 and the 1968. 
After the last Saddam Hussein became the vice president of Iraq before taking over as the 
President of the Republic in 1979. Saddam Hussein's government was severely criticized 
by the UN and the international community for its mistreatment of citizens, brutal 
measures against political dissidents, eight year long armed conflict with Iran in the 80's 
and invasion of Kuwait in 1990 that sparked the first Gulf war through a Security Council 
resolution. Prior to the invasion Iraq, its citizens were sentenced to penury and suffered 
from lack of a vibrant civil society culture for the government's political repression. 
Legality of the Iraq war 
Historically, a state was free to treat its citizens, as it wished based on the 
principle of sovereignty.31If we leave out the religious and national solidarity factor 
encouraging interventions, the first legal doctrine developed during the Grotius era32. In 
1625 he wrote: 
", whether a war for the subjects of another be just, for the purpose of defending 
them from injuries by their rulers. Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil societies 
were formed, the ruler of each claimed some especial right over his own subjects .... (But) 
31 L . OUIS Henkin, 'The Internationalization of Human rights' (1977) 6 Proceedings of the General 
EdUcation Seminar 7, quoted in Louis Henkin et al (eds), International Law: Cases and Materials 
(1987)981 
32 
. For general discussion see Andrew Field, The legality of Humanitarian Intervention and the Use of Force 
In the Absence of United Nations Authority, Monash University Law Review (Vol 26 no2 '00) 
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if a tyrant .... practices atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can approve, the 
right of social human connection is not cut off in such case. ,,33 
The Grotius doctrine of 'Social human connection' was followed in many· 
interventions since then34 but mostly remained as an exception to the rule of non 
intervention. Situations were overlooked when there existed no Real Politik benefit but 
never on the ground of non-interventional theory. As Field points out, it was only after 
the UN Charter was drafted that 'a split in this near unanimity as to when humanitarian 
intervention was legitimate' arose in the legal scholarship. The debate is surrounded 
around Article 2(4) of the Charter that states, 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of any force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations. 35 
This article is considered to be a jus cog ens principle or peremptory norm 
meaning that states are obliged not to depart from this rule. The first paragraph 
emphasizes an outright ban on the use of force. The second paragraph provides the 
exceptions to this rule. Use of force is legitimate in case of self defense
36 
and collective 
deployments of force authorized by Chapter vii of the charter37• Since no other exception 
is made, it can be concluded that unilateral or collective use of force or humanitarian 
intervention without UN approval has been declared illegal in the Charter. 
Support for this position is apparent in the Corfu Channel case where the 
International court of Justice (ICJ) mentions intervention as capable of leading to 
33 
34 Hugo Grotius, 2 De Jure Belli est Pacis, ch xxv, 438 (1625, Whewell trans. 1853) quoted in Field 342 
David Scheffer 
35 
Charter ofthe United Nations (1945) reproduced in Louis Henkin et al (eds) Basic Documents to 
~~pplement International Law: Cases and Materials (2nd edition, 1987) 99 
37 Article 51 of the UN Charter 
Article 42 of the UN Charter 
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'perverting the administration of international justice itself 38. The IC] reiterated the 
doctrine once again in the case of Military and Paramilitary activities in and against 
Nicaragua in 1986. It further declared that Article 2(4) of the Charter became customary 
international law , a binding obligation for the states. 
Whatever the position of international law may have been, invasion, intervention 
and the most recent use of force phenomenon have kept the horrors of war alive in 
today's world. The post cold war era has produced a number of legal armed interventions 
many of which have been subject to criticisms by legal scholars. As pointed out by Anne 
Orford, the supporters of such trend dominate the scholarships today: 
'One of the most significant changes in international politics to emerge during that 
period was the growth of support, within mainstream international law and international 
relations circles, for the idea that force can be legitimately used as a response to 
humanitarian challenges .... ,39 
After the end of US-Russia enmity in the SC, the power to authorize use of force 
has proliferated unrestrictedly. Threat to peace has received very broad interpretations 
even to include popular leaders restricting market economy or WTO influence in their 
territories4o. Many scholars are looking at this development as human rights movements 
going on to the offensive. Realists defend this development on the ground that states' 
practice in this area is practically customary intemationallaw. In many cases action or 
silence by the international community is driven by political motivations. Even where the 
UN did not approve that attack, states have supported interventions directly or in silence 
38 
39 Corfu Channel case of the IC}, 1946 
Anne Orford, Reading humanitarian intervention: human rights and the use offorce in intemationallaw, 
~2 Cambridge University Press, 2003 
For example, Cuba and Venezuela are being considered as threats to regional stability by the USA 
because of their preferences for state owned enterprises. 
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where it affected their interest. The Indian intervention in East Pakistan that led to the 
independence of Bangladesh in 1971 from Pakistan is one of such cases. Despite UN 
condemning the actions as 'violation of Pakistan's territorial sovereignty', India got 
involved apparently overwhelmed by the refugee crises. In a contrasting situation 
province of Biafra in Nigeria did not receive any significant recognition or aid from the 
international community in its secessionist effort the same time. Supporting the NATO 
intervention in former Yugoslavia, which was not authorized by the SC, Field concluded 
that doctrine of humanitarian intervention must continue to exist41 
In this backdrop of debate regarding use of force and its validity under 
international law, the United Sates together with coalition forces led an attack against 
Iraq in April 2003. The coalition primarily defended its action by relying on the 
interpretations of the SC resolutions 678, 687 and 144142. These resolutions were adopted 
under the authority of chapter vii and were interpreted by the coalition force to have 
allowed them to invade Iraq. Supporters of the administration rallied behind the theories 
41 Field, ibid 361 
42 Resolution 678: Adopted in 29 November 1990, this resolution authorized the use offorce in 
Iraq to eject it from Kuwait and to restore peace and security in that area. It also authorized use of all 
'necessary means' for all relevant resolutions. The broad measure of all necessary means included military 
action. 
Resolution 687: Adopted in 3 April 1991, this resolution provided the conditions for cease fire 
and imposed continuing obligation on Iraq to eliminate its WMD in order to restore international peace and 
security. It further empowered the SC to take steps to implement the resolution and to secure peace and 
security in that region. -
Resolution 1441: This resolution was adopted in 8 November 2002 and gave Iraq the final 
~~portunity to comply with its obligation to disarm. It also warned Iraq of serious consequences in case of 
dailure to comply but did not specify any penalty or punishment. As no specific course of action was 
;scribed, this should not have been read as an authorization of using force against Iraq. Also the effort by 
th eys and UK governments in seeking a resolution specifically authorizing an attack against Iraq speak of 
elf understanding of the limitation of SC 1441. Similar view can be found 
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of supremacy of Security Council resolutions even when specific non-authorization 
. 43 
eXIsts . 
The Australian and UK governments relied on the interpretations of SC resolution 678 to 
justify the attack. 
The US government went a step further and built its case on the principle of self-
defense. After voting on SC resolution 1441, US Ambassador to the UN John 
Negroponte made his point clear by claiming ' ... this resolution does not constrain any 
member state from acting to defend itself against threat posed by Iraq .. ,44 . 
There has been no general acceptance of the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense 
within the structure of the UN beyond a possible right of interceptive self-defense. 
Interceptive self defense confers a right on states to defend themselves against actions of 
another state, of sufficient magnitude which clearly have a hostile intent, before the 
aggressor's forces actually execute the attack.45 The mostly noted pre-emptive attack 
under Article 51 was the Israeli air strike on a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 that was 
criticized by the UNSC as a clear violation of internationallaw.
46 
The mere fact that both arguments for and against the Iraq war involved legality 
under international law has been praised by many. Professor Ibrahim 1. Gassama quoted 
wrote, 
43 
For example consider Hoover Fellow and Professor of Law at the Stanford University, Abraham D. 
Sofaer's argument" It is unreasonable to refuse to give weight to Security Council actions in evaluating the 
need (and hence the legality) for using force merely because the Security Council may not have granted 
~xplicit authority" in On the Legality of Preemption, Hoover Digest 2003 No 2 p 68. 
45 wWw.pbs.org!newshourlbblinternational/july-dec02/iraq_setup_11-08.html - 23k -
Y Dinstein, War, Aggression & Self Defense (Cambridge, University Press 3
rd 
edition 2001) 172-173 
~uoted in Peters n 12 p 10. 
For a general discussion on this see ibid 
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"One must pause and reflect on the fact that at least for a short period and at a 
certain level of discourse, the notion of international legality attained a status few were 
willing to challenge openly- certainly not on the rhetorical plane. 47 " 
Though the UN Secretary General in his personal capacity has called the invasion 
illegal, the official stand of the world organization is still not clear. Scholars continue to 
argue both sides only to prove the weakness of international legal regime in this regard. 
The UN SC resolution 1483 virtually drove the issue in a different wave while 
recognizing the coalition force as occupying authority thus binding them under the laws 
of war. 
Authority of UN in delegating power to occupiers 
When the UN undertakes to administer temporary administration of any country 
or territory, it seems easier to justify the legitimacy of its actions under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. The authority of the Security Council under Article 39 justifies any action 
by the body in responding to "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression" 48. As the language permits broad interpretation, internal 
conflict, breakdown of security structure as well as governance complications can be 
described to amount to threat to peace and security. The Council has previously used the 
measures to address humanitarian disasters, refugee crises and the like
49
. The same 
argument could be used to evaluate the authority of the coalition forces as occupying 
47 
Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The invasion of Iraq in Context 18 Emory 
!tl. L. Rev. 7 2004 
49 Article 39 of the Charter 
Article 39 has been invoked to address the situations in Haiti, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda etc. 
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powers. Whether 'occupation' itself is a violation of international law remains to be 
explored, UN's delegating the governance function to an occupying power must be 
recognized as valid under chapter VII of the Charter. 
Question may arise as to whether introducing a temporary government structure is 
within the authority of Article 38. Though measures like imposition of embargo, 
interruption of communication or severing diplomatic relations have been identified as 
valid actions by the SC in addition to use of force, these are by no means exhaustive and 
may include temporary governance solutionsso. The introduction of international criminal 
tribunals for former Yugoslavia and RwandaSl through the Council supports the view that 
going beyond the expressed provisions of the Charter is well within the authority of Sc. 
As long as a threat to peace is determined, any measure by the SC seems to be under the 
purview of the Charter. Accordingly, creating an institution for governance and 
delegating the authority to an occupying force do not pose any legal concerns. 
Another pressing argument concerning the legitimacy of such a temporary 
government authorized by the SC is that it contradicts the principle of state sovereignty. 
"Based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members"s2 the UN Charter 
mandates that members settle their international disputes by peaceful manners and refrain 
" in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state"S3. The notion of occupation is directly 
conflicting with the utterances of the Charter until the provision of enforcement under SC 
50 Art· 1 IC e 41 of UN Charter 
~l SfRes/827 (1993) established that International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia 
2 Article 2( 1) of the Charter 
S3 Art· 1 
IC e 2(4) ofthe Charter 
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authority comes into effect54. This principle of subjecting state sovereignty to the 
judgments of a few powerful states, namely the SC permanent members is a controversial 
but influential one. Once in effect, it legitimizes all actions taken by the SC including 
building temporary governance institutions. Since members of the UN submit to the 
authority of UN Charter, they also agree to this SC superiority over their sovereign 
powers. This consented demotion of sovereignty may raise philosophical concerns but is 
perfectly within the realm of international law. 
The Occupying power and Their Legal Authority 
It is an interesting phenomenon of international law that law of occupation deals 
exclusively with the consequences of an occupation after it has taken place 
notwithstanding the reasons or justification of the occupation. Likewise, the Iraq war or 
invasion without the Security Council resolution may have been illegal, but as soon as the 
coalition forces satisfied the requirements of becoming occupying force, the yardstick for 
their performance was obligations of occupying forces under intemationallaw. In order 
to determine the scope of authority of the CPA and its implementation, it is essential to 
look at the law of occupation. 
According to Article 42 of 1907 Hague Convention N respecting the laws and 
customs of war on land, 
54 Art. 
Icle 2(7) of the Charter, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll" 
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"Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority 
of the hostile army'65. 
Shortly after the US led coalition entered Iraq, there was little doubt about the 
failure of Saddam Hussein's government to exercise effective authority over Iraq's 
affairs. Legitimacy of the occupation came through SC Res. 1483 that established the US 
and UK forces as occupying power and recognized their authorities, responsibilities and 
obligations under applicable internationallaw56 
International humanitarian law clearly communicates the authorities and 
responsibilities of the occupying power embedded in Article 42-56 of the Hague 
Conventions7 • Whether the occupying power has successfully met its obligations is a 
question of fact and requires careful examination of the events that followed the 
occupation. 
The first and perhaps the foremost obligation of an occupying power IS 'to 
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country ,58. The Hague Convention 
continues with duties of the occupying power to refrain from forcing the inhabitants to 
furnish information relating to the belligerent or of the belligerent defense59, compelling 
the inhabitants to swear allegiance to it60, confiscating private property61, 100ting62 etc. 
55 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907 retrieved from 
56 . 
SIResl1483 (2003) retrIeved from 





59 Icle 43 of the Hague Convention IV of 1907 
Article 44 
60 Article 45 




Duties binding the US led coalition as occupying powers are also found in the 
Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of war. 
Part ill of the Convention puts forth the obligations of occupiers towards the people 
within the territory and management of different resources of the territory (Part III). Few 
provisions of the additional protocol of the Convention (I of 1977) also apply to the 
occupiers. 
SC Res. 1483 and SC Res. 1511 removed whatever limitations the codified law 
may have presented and allowed the authority broader range of powers including 
administration of justice and post conflict reconstruction measures. 
Question arose whether the provisions of human rights instruments like ICCPR 
and ECHR should have been applied to the Iraqi people. The ICJ commented on the 
Advisory opinion on Nuclear weapons, 
"The protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does 
not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby 
certain provisions may be derogatedfrom in a time of national emergency,,63 
Though signatories of the treaties both UK and US maintained otherwise.
64 
The 
occupying power thus derogated from a well-established principle of international law. 
63 
64 Para 25, Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, ICJ website 
The US contended that ICCPR does not apply during armed conflicts and outside the territory of the 
United States; The UK maintained that ECHR only applies to contracting parties and within the borders of 
a signatory. For more on this see Ralph Wilde, The applicability of International Human Rights Law to the 
Coalition Provisional Authority(CPA) and Foreign Military Presence in Iraq 11 ILSA 1.In1'l & Compo L. 
(485-495) 2004-2005 
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Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Occupying liberators 
Led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, the CPA was created replacing the 
ORHA and its primary responsibility of reconstruction of Iraq. "The lack of an 
authoritative and unambiguous statement about how this organization was established" 
65gave way to two competing theories about its creation. On one hand it may have been 
an act by the US President materializing by a National Security Presidential Directive 
(NSPD), on the other SC Res. 1483 have been mentioned as the primary source for its 
creation. The official version of the CPA documents also leave this question unanswered 
and rather discusses deriving of its authority from the SC Res. 1483, the laws of war and 
from the institution of CPA itself6. 
The mandate was to exercise powers of government temporarily during the 
transitional period that included restoring conditions of stability and security, creating 
conditions for the Iraqi people to be able to determine their political future through 
restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative 
government and facilitation of economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and 
development67 . All the laws previously in force in Iraq were declared valid as long as 
they were consistent with the CPA objectives and did not become obsolete because of 
any action by the CPA or Iraqi government
68 
. 
65 L. Elaine Halchin, The coalition Provisional Authority: Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional 
authorities, CRS Report for Congress April 29, 2004 retrieved from 
~tP:llwww.fas.org/man/crsIRL32370.pdf on March 27, 2007 
. CP AlREGI16 May 2003/01 retrieved from Official website of the CPA http://www.cpa-
~.org/regulations/#Regulations on March 27, 2007 
68 CPNREGI16 May 2003/01 Section 1 Para 1 
CPA Reg. 1 Section 2 
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In its promulgated 12 regulations69, 100 orders, 17 memoranda and 13 public 
notices, the CPA exercised its authority as vested through the SC sometimes going 
outside the sphere of its mandate. 
Though the authority and objectives of the CPA had been explained in precise 
terms, the background of its establishment remained in the dark. The communication 
from the US administration had been one of eliminating options rather than offering one. 
Halchin correctly observed, 
Available infonnation about the authority found in materials produced by the 
Administration alternatively: (1) deny that it is a federal agency; (2) state that it is a U.S. 
government entity; (3) suggest that it was enacted under United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1483; (4) refer to it, and OHRA, as "civilian groups .... reporting to 
the Secretary [of Defense 1,,70 
The true identity of such an institution may seem less important than its mission 
under the circumstances, but its long running effect is undeniable. Lack of founding 
institution may have allowed the CPA officials, more specifically the Administrator 
evade accountability and face possible consequences for the mismanagement of issues 71. 
69 The official CPA website defines 'Regulations' as instruments that define the institutions and authorities 
of the CPA; 'Orders' as binding instructions or directives to the Iraqi people that create penal consequences 
or have a direct bearing on the way Iraqis are regulated, including changes to uaqi law; 'Memoranda' as 
expand on Orders or Regulations by creating or adjusting procedures applicable to an Order or Regulation; 
'Public Notices' as the intentions of the Administrator to the public and may require adherence to security 
measures that have no penal consequence or reinforces aspects of existing law that the CPA intends to 
enforce 
70 • 
71 Halchin, CRS Report, p 38 
The CPA was accountable to the Department of Defense of the United States. The UN or the Iraqi people 
had no authority over the institution thus no way of evaluating its performance. 
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Governing Council of Iraq: Shadowy existence 
On July 13 of 2003, the CPA formed a 25 member interim body called Governing 
Council of Iraq. This diverse Council consisted of 13 Shia Muslims, 5 Sunni Muslims, 5 
Kurds, 1 Christian and 1 Turkrnen. CPA formally recognized the Council as 'the 
principal body of the Iraqi interim administration, pending the establishment ·of an 
internationally recognized, representative government by the people of /raq,72. 
According to the CPA, its main responsibility was to uphold Iraqi people's interest in the 
interim administration and 'in determining the means of establishing an internationally 
recognized, representative government' 73. The Council was to provide advice and 
leadership to the CPA until the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim government. 
Though the Council's power was subject to the authority of the CPA administrator, few 
controversial decisions by the body had not been officially endorsed by the CPA. For 
example, Iraq's secular family law was about to be replaced by Islamic law giving rise to 
concerns that it would undermine women's rights and privileges traditionally enjoyed in 
Iraqi society74. This Council also declared the day Baghdad fell as a national holiday and 
banned television stations that did not support the coalition agendas. 
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the Governing Council was the 
preparation of the temporary constitution 'Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)' to 
determine the governance structure of the interim administration, timeline for a National 
Assembly election, drafting of a permanent constitution and elections to a permanent 
CPAlREG/13 July 2003106 
C~AlREG/13 July 2003/06 
DIrective 137 of December 29, 2003 passed by the Governing Council of Iraq 
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government. A closer look at the drafting and content of this document is warranted for 
evaluating the Council's role in rebuilding Iraq. 
The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, also 
known as the TAL became effective on June 30, 2004 after the CPA formally transferred 
sovereignty to the interim administration. The TAL declared Iraq as republic, federal, 
democratic and pluralistic 75 where the 'federal system shall be based upon geographic 
and historical realities and separation of powers and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, 
nationality, or confession,.76 Islam was proclaimed the official religion of Iraq77 , a 
feature all too familiar with the regions' countries to which secular Iraq had been a 
progressive exception. The emphasis on religion grew stronger as it was mentioned as a 
source of legislation. Later on an identical provision is found in the permanent 
Constitution of Iraq. 
In its 62 Articles within 9 chapters, the TAL promises many reforms including 
'the basic rights of all Iraqis, including freedom of religion and worship, the right to free 
expression, to assemble peacefully, to vote, to a fair trial, and to be treated equally under 
the law,78; independence of the judiciary and separation of powers; balanced executive 
powers by the President and the Prime Minister and federalism. Many of the provisions 
have come under vigorous criticism from legal scholars. Whereas the fundamental right 
regime is more progressive than most other constitutions in the world including the USA, 
many others fail to meet practical considerations. The chapter five clauses that requires 
two-third majority among National Assembly members to agree on the identity of the 
75 Arti 
76 cle 4 of TAL 
17 Article 4 of TAL 
. 78 Article 7(A) of TAL 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/democracyITAL-themes.html 
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presidency council consisting of a president and two vice-presidents has attracted a lot of 
negative comments from scholars79 . Calling it a 'neo-colonial imposition' and 
' .. Characteristic of only one nation on Earth, i.e. American Iraq' professor Juan Cole 
observed 
HI fear it is functioning in an anti-democratic manner to thwart the will of the 
majority of Iraqis, who braved great danger to come out and vote ,,80 
Minority groups seem to have considerable rights in the TAL. The National 
Assembly needs a three fourth majority to pass a measure if vetoed by the presidency 
council after passing by a simple majority. The 'three fourth majority' rule also applies in 
amending the TAL. Though this emphasis on the minority consensus in national issues 
has met with criticisms, there is true potential for building a just society by implementing 
this provision. Majority preferred democracies led to much violent oppression of 
marginal communities throughout history81 and securing legislative measures only by 
confirming minority approval can translate into a protection of minority rights in Iraq. 
This can also create check and balance situation in the National Assembly to diffuse the 
interests of conservative religious groups in legislating laws denying rights to women in 
the name of religion. Unfortunately, rather than uniting different groups, the TAL and 
79 Article 36 (A) of TAL provides, "The National Assembly shall elect a President of the State and two 
Deputies. They shall form the Presidency Council, the function of which will be to represent the 
sovereignty oflraq and oversee the higher affairs of the country. The election of the Presidency Council 
shall take place on the basis of a single list and by a two-thirds majority of the members' votes. The 
~ational Assembly has the power to remove any member of the Presidency Council of the State for 
Incompetence or lack of integrity by a three-fourths majority of its members' votes. In the event of a 
vacancy in the Presidency Council, the National Assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of its members, 
~~ect a replacement to fill the vacancy." 
Juan Cole is professor of modern Middle Eastern and South Asian history at the University of Michigan 
and hosts a reputed web diary on events in Iraq. He is quoted from a BBC online feature retrieved from 
~ews.bbc.co.uk/2/hiJmiddle eastl4359559.stm on March 30, 2007. 
Consider the ethnic violence in Yugoslavia, Rwanda in the 90's. 
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subsequent permanent constitution of Iraq has successfully divided ethnicities and tum 
the country into a violent society. 
Iraqi Interim Government: Conditional sovereignty 
The Iraqi interim government was described as the first initiative of the occupying 
power to return sovereignty of Iraq to Iraqi people. Facilitated by Lakhdar Brahimi, 
Special Advisor on Iraq to the Secretary General of the UN and in consultation with the 
CPA and the Governing council, 'The Iraqi Interim Government was formed through a 
process of wide-ranging consultation with Iraqis, including political leaders, religious 
and tribal leaders and civic associations,82. Operating under the TAL this government 
consisted of a President, two Deputy Presidents, a Prime Minister leading a Council of 
Ministers, an interim national council composed of diverse groups of Iraqis and a Judicial 
authority. The primary responsibility of the interim government was to prepare for the 
national election to be held through which a representative Iraqi Transitional Government 
would come into being and lead the country towards a permanent constitution and 
democratic leadership. Begin functioning on June 30 of 2004, the interim body had only 
till January 1, 2005 to prepare for the national election. Tasks like administering day to 
day affairs of Iraq, providing welfare and security for the people and promoting economic 
development were also in the agenda of this body. 
Though this government was recognized by the UN and few other countries as 
sovereign power of Iraq, the occupying forces specially the US exercised actual control 
Over the territory. The CPA was officially dissolved but by installing a group of Iraqis 
82 • 
. IraqI Interim Government, Announcement ceremony Press packet, retrieved from http://www.cpa-
i~I&!J~!W:nm~'Q@~Pill'~llili on March 31, 2007 
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loyal to the occupation agendas, they managed to dictate the events from under a veil. 
The 31 member body was crowded with exile Iraqis and US favorites. The most powerful 
position in Iraq for this interim period went to Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who had been 
reported to be closely related to the CIA and US administration during exile years83. 
Even though the appointments were officially made by the UN representative, the fact of 
Mr. Brahimi's resignation only after two weeks speaks volumes about his approval of the 
84 process . 
Many controversial actions of the interim government have been linked to the 
Prime Minister including reintroducing capital punishment for criminal offences85, 
fonnation of a secret spy agency to tackle insurgency, and banning news channel Al 
Jazeera for thirty days. Allawi has been reported to have executed suspected insurgents 
himself in the presence of at least a dozen Iraqi and American security personnel. To 
appoint Allawi in the significant position can be viewed as an assurance of de facto CPA 
rule in Iraq. 
The Interim government was vested with powers 'to conclude international 
agreements in the areas of diplomatic relations and economic reconstruction, including 
Iraq's sovereign debt' without being able to 'amend the TAL or to form agreements 
which permanently alter the destiny of Iraq' 86. Ironically drafted by chosen Iraqis of the 
CPA, some of the provisions of the TAL have changed Iraq and its secular heritage 
83 V . anous articles published in New York Times, Washington Post and other reputed media outlets 
~~ggested such connections . 
. In an June 22, 2004 Asian times Article, Kilveh Afrasiabi wrote, "the mere fact that Lakhdar Brahimi, the 
. UN's special envoy on Iraq, has reportedly tendered his resignation out of frustration with the Bush 
a~mi~istration, which undercut his efforts to install an interim government in Iraq after misleading him into 
thinking that this would be essentially his call, represents another sobering lesson of "roads not taken" by 
World organization vis-a-vis a major international crisis" retrieved from 
,~~~~Qill~illTh~~~~WL~illktb~~nm~onMay7,2007 
abolished the death penalty for any criminal offence in Iraq. 
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profoundly and the so-called sovereign government was openly forbidden to change any 
of those. During the Governing Council and mterim Government, fundamental changes 
made to Iraqi economic structure also raises question of sovereignty and whether these 
Transitional Administrations complied with their authorities prescribed by international 
law. 
Before handing over sovereignty to the interim administration, Paul Bremer 
promised to withdraw coalition troops upon request from the government. As any request 
was never made, the troops got comfortable. The trend continues today. Iraq is 
unofficially under US military surveillance. There is even talk in the US to send more 
troops. Where allies in the coalition including the UK have taken steps to remove their 
presence from Iraq, US continue to call the shots today. The occupying cap may not be 
there any more, but US claims moral authority to advise, criticize even force certain 
agendas inside Iraq. 
Iraqi Transitional Government 
After the election took place for the National Assembly in January 2005 under the 
leadership of the Iraqi interim Government, the Iraqi Transitional Government became 
the first elected government of Iraq after the occupation in 2003. This body also operated 
under the TAL. Besides the traditional governance functions, the Transitional 
Government's main responsibilities were to draft a permanent constitution and to form a 
permanent democratic government. 
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The National Assembly failed to form a representative government as Sunni 
Iraqis boycotted the election. The structure of the government remained the same as the 
interim government as TAL was the foundation for both. This government's performance 
as the drafter of the constitution met with severe criticism. As I take a look at the 
constitution building process in chapter two, it becomes clear that the rushed process 
presented a constitution with numerous rights without much planning for the 
implementation and left a lot of loop holes through which Iraqi society may become 
hostage to civil war, theocracy and male domination. After two years, many of those 
fears are coming alive. 
Multi National Force (MNF) 
Referring to the coalition forces as multi national force, the UN welcomed the 
'willingness of the multinational force to continue efforts to contribute to the 
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in support of the political transition,87. Thus 
occupation forces under the CPA became UN mandated security forces under the 
sovereign transitional government. They were bound to act 'in accordance with 
international law, including obligations under international humanitarian law,88. 
During the occupation, these forces have been accused of using incendiary 
weapons violating norms of international humanitarian law89. More than thousand 
innocent people have reportedly been killed by the troops during house searches, check 
posts, -air raids and in other circumstances. One of the most publicized incidents despite 
87 SCIREG/1546 of 2004 
88 Id 
89 Reputed NGOs like Amnesty International and Global Policy Forum among others have accused the 
coalition forces of using napalm, white phosphorus, depleted uranium, cluster munitions and other 
incendiary weapons on civilian targets. 
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attempt to cover up took place in Haditha on November 19 2005, in which case the 
members of the troops went into a rampage killing 24 innocent Iraqis when one of their 
soldiers died in a roadside bomb9o. The insecurity faced by the MNF is sometimes met 
with frustration and random shooting of the civilians. The latest incident in March 2005 
regarding the killing of an Italian secret service agent by mistake at a US check point in 
Baghdad attracted much attention and brought this neglected issue for discussion
91
• 
Immunity granted to the coalition force by the CP A that translated into immunity 
for the multinational force prevented any of the atrocities to be tried in Iraqi courts. The 
troops are under the jurisdiction of their native countries, similar to the UN peace keeping 
force regulations. Only a few complaints of violence and atrocities against the US forces 
have been investigated resulting in convictions for even fewer soldiers. 
Nation Building 
"The ultimate goal for Iraq is a durable peace for a unified and stable, 
democratic Iraq that is underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing 
market economy. A key long-range strategic objective is a secure environment for people 
and property that enables citizens to participate fully in political and economic lije,,92. 
[Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments] 
90 
See May 29, 2006 issue of Washington Post ~ http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-
. ,~Yn/content/articleI2006/051281 AR200605280 1 011.html 
". US troops killed Nicola Calipari as he was returning with Giuliana Sgrena, a hostage whose release he 
'. Just facilitated on March 4 2005. See full coverage on 
. 'h~:llwww.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/O" 1431126,OO.html 
An Historic Review oj CPA Accomplishments retrieved from http://www.cpa-iraq.org! 
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Right before returning sovereignty to elected transitional authorities, the CPA 
communicated its strategic 'goals and objectives' in these words. It claimed to have 
'achieved its primary goals' before leaving Iraq and helped Iraqis build the fundamental 
pillars of sovereigrity- security, essential services, economy and governance. 
Nation building by a foreign power may mean exercising the domestic authority 
to create an institutional framework to return sovereignty to the people through a political 
process. Depending on the existing preconditions of a territory, it may mean fostering a 
national identity or nurturing a political culture that represents the interest of its citizens. 
Whatever the goal may be the foreign power must respect original sovereignty of the 
people and keep in mind the cultural component of their lives. Reforms imposed by 
external experts or ideologies notwithstanding the experiences of the native people are 
destined to fail93 • The actions of the CPA, Governing Council, Interim Government and 
Transitional Government must be weighed against the requirement of acting within their 
authority. 
Though SC Res. 1483 recognized the coalition as occupying power allowing them 
venture into nation building to some extent, the right came with limited authority. The 
occupying forces were only authorized to restore a country's law and order situation 
without altering any fundamental feature of it94. The restriction CPA put on the 
Governing Council and the Interim Government through TAL and an obligation not to 
amend it were meant for them in terms of drafting the temporary Constitution. 
: 93 
For example, Ash U Bali mentions Toby Dodge as detailing the ambitious and unsuccessful British effort 
to build a liberal Iraq that tried to 'transplant foreign political conceptions and institutions without a 
understanding of Iraqi society'. 30 Yale 1. Int'l. L. 2005 (431-466). For a contrasting picture, 
. reconstruction of Germany by the US after the WWII. 
ArtIcle 43 of 1907 Hague Regulations 
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Under the mandate of previous TAs and occupation Law, security is the first and 
foremost important issue for the temporary authority. In a report published in October 
2004 , the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded in part, 
" war in Iraq has probably inflamed radical passion among Muslims, and that's 
increased Al Qaeda's recruiting power and morale, and at least marginally its operating 
b'l' ,,95 capa l lty . 
The consequences of the T A's failure to rebuild the security structure have not 
only failed to solve the present security concerns but also created a dangerous future for 
the whole region. Previously the US has criticized the UN for its lack of planning and 
resources of peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world96• Ironically the US 
forces in Iraq met with the same reactions from many sources. 
In the form of economic reconstruction, the CPA had introduced major changes in 
the existing Iraqi structure even before the Governing Councilor Interim Government 
came into existence. By promulgating orders, the CPA Administrator removed all 
conditions, safeguards even sovereign preferences from the Iraqi economic regime to 
allow market economy to flourish. During its 13 month rule in Iraq, the CPA facilitated 
the transition of Iraqi economy from a 'non-transparent centrally planned economy to a 
market economy characterized by sustainable economic growth through the 
establishment of a dynamic private sector,97. In the process, many fundamental changes 
were brought about in the economic framework98: 
Cross posted from Democracy Now website @ 
~ttp://www.democracynow.orglarticle.pl ?sid=03/1 0/16/1534236 
6 US State Department's official comment on Brahimi report on UN Peacekeeping reform, retrieved from 
Wp://www.usembassy.itlfile200008/alia/a0082307.htm (page last visited AprilS, 2007). 
98 CPNORD/19 September 2003/39 
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• Privatization of state-owned enterprises 
• National treatment of foreign firms 
• 100% foreign ownership permissible in all sectors except oil and mineral 
extraction 
• Unrestricted and tax free remittance of all funds related to investment 
• Forty year ownership licenses with an option to renew 
• Reduction of corporate tax to flat rate of 15% 
• Suspension of 25% levy on company profits 
• Immunity of Foreign Liaison Missions, their personnel, property, funds or 
assets from Iraqi legal system during the CPA administration. 
These orders modifying the fundamental features of Iraqi economic scenario raise some 
serious concerns. First of all, the CPA opened all state enterprises for privatization 
including utility services. In most countries of the world, particularly in the developing 
countries governments are usually held as the guardians of people's welfare and 
responsible for offering these basic necessities of everyday lives to everyone including 
the ones who are unable to provide for the services99• The measure basically took away 
the hope for the marginalized population of Iraq. Unemployment of government 
employees and offering reconstruction contracts to non Iraqi firms contributed largely to 
the unemployment problem in the aftermath of the conflict. 100 
Measures related to foreign investments are potentially more harmful for the Iraqi 
-
economy than the claim of improving it. Allowing 100% foreign ownership in important 
99 n . unng my stay in Doha, Qatar from 1988-1990, the utility services of water, electricity, telephone etc 
:re provided free for all citizens and residents in that country. Recently Qatar introduced utility charges. 
Supra n Bali p 442 
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sectors, unrestricted tax free remittance, 40 year contracts with options for renewal- each 
of these rules make it impossible for a war tom country to revive and rebuild its 
economy. The national treatment clause meant for foreign investments stand in complete 
contrast to the general internationally accepted measure for developing countries where 
governments subsidize or otherwise facilitate the blooming of businesses owned by their 
citizens. Even the WTO leaves discretionary power to government under special 
circumstances to regulate aspects of foreign investment and native businesses. One of the 
reasons a multi lateral treaty on foreign investment does not exist today is the deep 
division between the interests of the global north and the global south. Developed 
countries are interested in unrestricted access and tax free exits with profits whereas the 
developing countries insist on accountability and the final word on investment sectors. As 
a result bi lateral investment treaties are made worldwide ironically many times to the 
detriment of the interest of developing countries.101 A country like Iraq struggling to 
survive literally in every state affair and recovering from decade long economic sanction 
and two wars is definitely in no position to negotiate a treaty in equal footing. So, the 
impact ofthese rules is 'stark and designed to be durable ,102 • 
Ideally all these changes are not permanent as the democratically elected 
government can amend these provisions. Practically, however, this proved to be 
ineffective. Dependence on international aid mostly backed by the US and the existence 
of the US companies and investors through the CPA orders in the beginning of post 
conflict period made it even harder for a fragile government to negotiate an exit strategy. 
101 
See Zakia Afrin, Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development in the Least- Developed 
. Countries, Annual Survey of International &Comparative Law, vol. x 2004 for a complete discussion. 
102 
Supra n Bali p 443 
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The long term reform strategy that Iraqi economy needed had been absent during the 
transitional period and it became a new challenge for post conflict Iraq. 
The discussion about CPA actions that led to this economic malfunction for Iraq 
must not deviate attention from the fact that those orders were made without authority, in 
violation of international law. The Transitional authorities' actions, besides bringing 
concerns over legitimacy contradict with the notion of sovereignty. 
The reconstruction of essential services was another major task that the CPA took 
over. Lack of adequate preparation had its effect on this. In the words of the CPA 
Administrator, 
"The reconstruction job proved to be harder than we anticipated because 
American prewar planning had not anticipated the enormity and difficulty of the tasks 
ahead of us" 103. 
According to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the US 
House of Congress, $20 billion was disbursed to the CPA during its 14 months stay in 
Iraq as Iraq Development Fund (IDF) and others l04 . Stressing that the IDF were not 
'appropriated American funds' rather' Iraqi Funds' Mr. Bremer answered the allegations 
of mismanagement of the money in very simple manner 
"I rfi l' B h .1". l' . I ,, 105 t was not a pe ect so utzon. ut t ere were no pelject so utzons In raq 
Involvement of US corporations in the reconstruction effort from the very 
beginning of Iraq situation has raised many eyebrows. The CPA, however denied its 
103 Oral Remarks by the Honorable Ambassador L Paul Bremer, III before the committee on Government 
oversight and Reform, U.S House of Representatives, February 6 2007 ;retrieved from Committee's 
official website http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20070206131720-22115.pdf (last visited April 5, 
2007) 
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involvement in awarding the contracts and maintained that the Army had been in charge 
of reconstructions contractsl06• This fact, however, complements the growing trend of UN 
-World Bank advocacy of engaging private enterprises in war tom societies for bringing 
about economic reform. lO? Truly the private sector can attract flow of capital, 
employment and necessary services in most cases; at the same time it may also create 
indecent disparities of income between different groups and aid government corruption. 
The negative effects of ill managed privatization may range from lack of native industries 
to a destabilized society on the verge of civil war. Random economic globalization 
promoting free market economy had divided functioning societies. In case of Iraq it may 
have even contributed to aggravate the sectarian divides. 
Disagreement with UN about the Iraq invasion or arrogance of doing it alone, 
whatever the reason may have been the UN had a very limited role to play in CPA 
dominated sovereign Iraq. In the beginning of recognizing the invasion, the Security 
Council envisioned a greater involvement and requested appointment of a special 
representative for the country108. The Council also mandated the representative's 
Responsibilities to be coordination of the activities of the UN in post conflict processes, 
coordination among UN and other international agencies engaged in reconstruction and 
humanitarian activities and coordination with the CPA in matters of return of refugees 
and displaced persons, restore and establish institutions for representative governance, 
106 
In the Oral Remark, Mr. Bremer mentioned, "Before I leftfor Iraq, the Pentagon designated the 
Department of the Army as the executive agent for the CPA, including "Management oversight for the 
acquisition and contracting support". The Army's contracting responsibilities extended to both the Iraqi 
{l:JUls and the appropriatedJunds." Oversight Committee Report 
For discussion of the joint effort by the UN and World Bank, see Allen Garson, Peace Building: The 
fo1vate sectors role in 95 Am. J. Int'! L. 2001 (102-119) 
SClREGI1483 
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economic reconstructions etc l09. A subsequent resolution established the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMl)llO. Unfortunately the good start didn't last long as 
UN pulled out of Iraq following the bombing of its compound in Iraq that resulted in 
deaths of fifteen UN staff members including the Special Representative Sergio Vieira de 
Mello. Just a month back he mentioned the need for UN to communicate their 
independent identity and will to help the Iraqi 'people as a prerequisite for successlll . 
After the unfortunate event UN withdrew for some time and then went in again only to 
. maintain a very low profile in the country. At present UNDP, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WHO, 
FAO, UNHCR and few other UN agencies are running numerous project in Iraq. This 
role, however, is very limited compared to traditional peacekeeping and nation building 
involvement of the UN. 
Involvement of development organizations or NGO's in the reconstruction phase 
may come as a relief. As Professor Monshipouri observed about Afghanistan, 
"Without cooperation between NGOs, international organizations, civil society 
and the state, it is virtually impossible to deal effectively with the country's humanitarian 
crisis" 112 
-same could be argued about Iraq. In describing how NGOs are contributing to the 
peace building and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, he mentions the PEACE 
(Poverty Eradication and Community Empowerment) initiative of the UNDP which sets 
109 
Id Para 8(e) 
110 SCIRes/1500 
111 In the report he stated, "The United Nations presence in Iraq remains vulnerable to any who would seek 
to target our Organization, as recent events in Mosul - described in the Secretary-General's report -
illustrate. Our security continues to rely significantly on the reputation of the United Nations, our ability to 
demonstrate, meaningfully, that we are in Iraq to assist its people, and our independence". Briefing to the 
~ecurity Council by Sergio Vieira De Mello, July 22,2003 




up village development committees (VDCs) to identify and supervise varIOUS 
reconstruction efforts thus introducing national problem solving at the grass root level 
1 
13 • 
While much attention had been given to economic reconstruction, the issues of 
environment and protection of cultural heritage have gone unnoticed. During the first few 
weeks of the occupation, Iraqi national museum was looted and valuable artifacts went 
missing. Despite warnings from experts and previous experience from the 1991 Gulf war, 
the coalition forces failed to take any measure to protect key archeological sites, libraries, 
museums and historical buildings. Though the existing Iraqi laws offered adequate 
protection for these possessions, priority of the occupying forces seem to favor protection 
of the oil fields over these ancient heritage. 
At the end of the 'Historic Review', there is a comparative chart of reconstruction 
milestones for Post Saddam Iraq and Post WWll Germany. Though the case studies are 
far from being of similar kind and thus not to be judged by the same yardstick, the 
comparison itself speak of the mismanagement that went into Iraq (See the chart in 
Annex 2). A rushed job in all spheres, the nation building exercise was bound to meet this 
troubled conclusion. 
The Transitional Administration in East Timor 
East Timor had been a portuguese colony (or mentioned as being administered by 
Portugal) until illdonesia intervened militarily and integrated the territory as its 27th 
Province in 1976114. Followed by a failed attempt to impose autonomy in East Timor 
under a unified illdonesian Government, The United Nations intervened and United 
113 Id 1 
114 P 42 
Dmted Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor @ 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimorlUntaetB.htm retrieved on March 23,2007 
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Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established through 
SC Res. 1272 of 1999115. Endowed with' overall responsibility for administration of East 
Timor' and empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority including the 
administration of justice,116 the UNT AET consisted of governance and public 
administration civilian police force of 1640 policemen, a humanitarian assistance and 
emergency response component, and an "armed UN peace keeping force of up to 8950 
troops and 200 military observers117• 
The UNT AET has been given a very specific mandate to 'provide security and 
maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor', 'to establish an effective 
administration', 'to assist in the development of civil and social services', 'to ensure the 
coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development 
assistance', 'to support capacity building for self-government', and 'to assist in the 
establishment of conditions for sustainable development' 118. The Transitional 
administrator, who was appointed by the UN Secretary General, exercised the power to 
enact new laws and amend, suspend or repeal existing ones. One of the first regulations 
he decreed in this regard provided that until replaced by UNT AET or democratic 
institutions of East Timor, laws in force in the region prior to October 1999 would 
continue to be applied 119. At the same time he ordered that certain Indonesian security 
115 For details on the unfolding of events in East Timor as described by the Peace and Security Section of 
the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping, 
mtp://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htmretrieved on March 23, 2007. 
116 . 
SC/ResI1272 (1999) retneved from 
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laws would no longer be applied in East Timor120. Among the priorities of the UNT AET 
administration was facilitating return and care of the refugees and displaced persons, 
restoration of public services, rebuilding of the judiciary and law enforcement systems 
and revival of economic activities. 
Conclusion 
A questionable invasion, a SC mandated authority over the occupied territory, drafting of 
a permanent constitution and installing an elected government later the US led occupiers 
are believed to be liable of multiple violations of international law. In order to determine 
the development if any of international legal regime through these events, answers to the 
questions posed at the beginning of this discussion it at utmost importance. 
1. The coalition did not have the authority to go into Iraq: 
Though legal scholars are divided in the issue, a careful reading of the UN Charter and its 
relevant provisions on use of force clearly render the occupation illegal. The Secretary 
General of the UN maintained from the beginning of the events leading to the invasion 
that military action without the Security Council authorization would violate the Charter, 
diplomatically avoiding the term 'illegal'. He broke his silence more than after a year of 
the event stating in a BBC interview 
120 
Matheson p 82 
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"1 have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of 
view andfrom the charter point of view it was illegal. ,,121 
International law is clear in this issue. The charter outlaws the threat or use of 
force in norms, which are recognized as jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international 
law. The obligations to settle disputes through peaceful means122, and refrain from using 
or threat of using force against territorial integrity or political independence of other 
states123 are absolute for UN member states. Only the Security Council has the authority 
to determine threat to peace and take actions accordingly124. States may act on their 
inherent right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs125 . 
The last two points have been argued by the US led coalition. The argument that 
SC Res 1441 provided an implied authority to use force against Iraq in case of non-
cooperation of the government, does not stand the test of legitimacy. As the resolution 
warned Iraq of severe consequences but left the option open, it required another 
resolution specifying the action. As per the self-defense argument, it did not meet the test 
of necessity as decided in the Caroline case that necessity of self defense must be 
" .. Instant, overwhelming, and leaving no moment for deliberation,,126. The claims 
of Iraq's link to al Qaeda, carrying weapons of mass destruction, buying nuclear raw 
materials from an African country all proved to be fabricated. The UN weapons Inspector 
Hans Blix in Iraq never found any weapons of mass destruction, neither was there any 
. imminent danger of terrorist attacks from Iraq to any other state. The UN Secretary 
121 
See the report in September 162004 issue of Guardian newspaper @ 
~P:llwww.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763, 1305709,OO.html (Last visited April to, 2007) 
123 Article 2(3) of UN Charter 
! 124 Article 2(4) of UN Charter 
12S Chapter VII of UN Charter 
126 Article 51 of UN Charter 
The Caroline Case, cross posted from International Law case book p 923 
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General commented correctly that such trends of pre-emptive self-defense might lead to a 
breakdown of international order. Around the fourth anniversary of Iraq invasion, there is 
little doubt that the occupation was illegal as was the attack a clear violation of 
intemationallaw. 
2. The occupying power assumed legal authority to govern Iraq: 
Though the Security Council refused the request of the US and UK to pass a resolution 
authorizing an attack in Iraq, after the occupation was established the UN organ seem to 
have changed its tone towards the coalition. Within months of the attack, effective 
occupation followed and UN recognized their authority under laws of war. It is 
interesting to observe that war has been outlawed in the previous century; even the term 
has been replaced by armed conflict. The Security Council called upon the 'Authority' as 
it called the occupiers to 'promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective 
administration of the territory' consistent with the Charter and other relevant international 
law. The resolution goes on to prescribe Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague 
Regulation of 1907 to the authority notwithstanding the fact that the basis of the 
formation of such authority was a mere violation of the Charter. 
After the formal recognition from the UN, the occupiers were to govern Iraq 
within the mandate of the SC resolution, laws of war and relevant international law . All 
the international human rights instruments that both the occupiers and Iraq have ratified 
should have been applied in Iraq. The authority, however, have shown indifference to 
these rules and argued that the Geneva Conventions should be the only legislation 
applicable under the circumstances. As a result, the authority interpreted the SC mandate 
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at its advantage and governed the occupied territory. It can be argued that the authority's 
legality was contingent upon the observance of international humanitarian and all 
relevant international law. The failure to take that fact in account rendered this authority 
legal yet exercising illegitimate power. 
3. The Transitional Authority governed exceeding its scope and limits: 
The SC resolution and laws of occupation conferred upon the CPA responsibility to 
restore law and order in the first place and to facilitate a smooth transition to democratic 
institutions without amending fundamental structures of the government. CPA itself 
mentioned its priorities to be reconstruction the areas of Security, Governance, Essential 
services and Economy. 
Whereas the CPA and subsequently the Governing Council, Interim 
Administration and Transitional Government all failed to provide minimum security and 
essential services for the people, drastic changes have been made to the country's 
governance and economic structure. As the authority brought about new laws permitting 
absolute privatization in Iraq, US companies like Halliburton, Bechtel, DynCorp and like 
harvested the profit to the extent that $19.6 billion used for reconstruction was 
mismanaged. Iraq's economy went into becoming market economy from a protective 
socialist system almost overnight. 
The governance structure also met with new challenges. The TAL drafted by the 
Governing Council under heavy influence of the CPA introduced Islam as an influential 
Source of legislation, brokered a sectarian electoral system many blame for Iraq's current 
'vil war situation and prescribed a weak federal government system. Though the TAL 
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was meant for the governance of the transitional period, many of its provisions found 
their way to the permanent constitution. 
The transitional authority left behind a legacy of gross human rights violation, 
prison abuse, extrajudicial killing together with awarding immunity for the multinational 
force. Today's Iraq is a painful reminder of the ill planning and strategic mismanagement 
of the transitional period. 
4. The transitional authority added new dimension to the existing sovereignty 
principle: 
International law recogmzes the notion of sovereignty established by the treaty of 
Westphalia (1648) and bases its principle of non-interference by other states on this 
traditional approach. The occupation force attacked the territorial and political 
independence of Iraq violating the non interference principle mandated by the UN 
charter. This violation was overridden by the Security Council as it vested the occupying 
power with responsibilities of governance in accordance with international law. Whether 
the Security Council acted within its authority to supersede the violation is another area 
that must be explored; but in this case there is nothing to suggest otherwise. 
The modem approach to sovereignty subject the states to its people and " ... states 
are bound by many rules which have not been ordered by their will,,127. As the concept of 
state sovereignty evolves around globalization and international co-operation, "The State 
is now widely understood to be the servant of its people,,128. This approach dictates that 
127 I d' n Ividual Opinion by Judge Alvarez in Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania),ICJ 1949 
P~a43 . 
128 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's Annual Speech to the UN General Assembly on September 20 
1999 
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sovereignty in law always remained with the Iraqi people even during the occupation. 
Sovereignty in fact or the power of executing state's will switched hands multiple times 
as different bodies assumed the roles of transitional authority. Since the elected 
transitional administration was the only body directly responsible to the Iraqi people, it 
may be regarded as the only time during the transitional phase that the sovereignty of the 
Iraqi people was truly respected. Thus more questions arise as I try to find the answer 
posed as the beginning of this section. This unique situation presented by the legitimacy 
and governance issues of the transitional authority in Iraq requires further attention to the 
research on the principle of sover:eignty. 
As I move forward with a discussion of the constitution making, treatment of 
women and attempt to secure post conflict justice in Iraq, I will present the new 










"The Constitution is a fundamental document. . ..... the purpose of a Constitution is not 
merely to create the organs of the State but to limit their authority, because, if no 
limitation was imposed upon the authority of the organs, there will be complete tyranny 
and complete oppression. The legislature may be free to frame any law; the executive 
may be free to take any decision; and the Supreme Court may be free to give any 
interpretation of the law. It should result in utter chaos" 
(Dr. Ambedkar, Framing of India's Constitution, vol 1 p 832)129 
Constitution is considered to be the most important legal document for any 
country. In most .parts of the world it is the supreme authority that is expected to define 
the authority of state officials, affirm the claim to sovereignty and build legitimate and 
effective institutions 130. This probably explains the urgency that the transitional authority 
in Iraq felt to draft a new constitution at the earliest opportunity. On October 15 2005 the 
Iraqis adopted a constitution through referendum that was drafted by members from 
elected National Assemblyl31.The 'historical legacy of deeply flawed 
constitutionalism,132 under colonial or dictatorial regimes helped to create expectation 
among Iraqis for a due process and truly progressive constitution after the fall of Saddam 
129 
130 Legally Speaking, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, Universal Law Publishing Co Pvt Ltd. P 27 
For more on this see in general, Nathanj. Brown, Constitutions in a Neoconstitutional World: Basic 
.. ~ws and Prospects for Accountable Government (2002) 
. The Elected Iraqi Transitional Government appointed members of the constitution drafting committee 
from among the National Assembly and few Sunni members from outside the Assembly as t~ey boycotted 
. ~ January '05 election. See Annex 1 for the complete list of members. 
Iraq's Constitutional Challenge, ICG Middle East Report No 19, 13 November 2003, p2 
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Hussein. 133 The success of drafting a new constitution for Iraq was conditional to proper 
attention to divergence in Iraq (Shiites, Sunnis, Kurdish and other minorities), The Iraqi 
exile community, regional interests, Islam factor, internal conflicts and international 
agendas while confirming the participation of the commoners in mind. The outcome was 
a feeble constitution born in a hasty process. 
'In this chapter I argue that neither the constitution nor the constitution making 
process met the expectations of the Iraqis or those of the observers of the event. That the 
new constitution failed to provide solutions for existing problems in a divided community 
and in many cases further exacerbated the conflict of interests among rival groups. While 
looking at the Iraqi constitution making process, I draw from the experience of another 
conflict stricken country Afghanistan and compare the two in order to provide a real life 
analysis of the phenomenon. In case of the constitution itself, I talk about the previous 
constitutions of Iraq to explain the points of departure from earlier oppressive regimes 
and try to analyze the effect of that in the Iraqi society. 
Inside the Constitution 
Derived from the Latin word 'praeambulum' meaning 'walking before', Preambles are 
important features of constitutions. They are not merely introductory paragraphs and bear 
long reaching effects. They are sometimes described to hold the mission statement of this 
, important document. There are many different types of Preambles written; some describe 
133 
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the struggle for creating a national identity, some talk about historical journey to a 
constitution, some remember the colonial oppression and vow to create a society that will 
ensure justice for all its citizens. There are exceptions as well. For example, in the case of 
the constitution of India, the largest constitution of the world consisting 560 Articles and 
amendments, the preamble simply mentions the fundamental principles yet serving two 
purposes: 
A) It indicates the source from which the Constitution derives its authority; 
B) It also states the objects, which the Constitution seeks to establish and promote. 
The Preamble of the Iraq constitution begins with Islamic connotation 'In the name of 
God, the Most merciful, the Most compassionate' followed by , We have honored the 
sons of Adam' putting a secular character of the State in question. It goes on to describe 
historical events supporting ancient national identity, remembering atrocities committed 
in its soil and aspiring to build a new country from the ruins" .. . so we sought hand in 
hand and shoulder to shoulder to create our new Iraq, the Iraq for the future, free from 
sectarianism, racism, complex of regional attachment, discrimination, and exclusion". It 
is interesting to note that nowhere the occupying force is mentioned. 
The Preamble mentions the future system to be, " republican, federal, democratic 
and pluralistic" and considers the principles of respecting the rule of law, establishing 
justice and equality, casting aside the politics of aggression, paying attention to women 
• and their rights, the elderly and their concerns and children and their affairs, spreading 
.. culture of diversity and defusing terrorism to be the determination of Iraqi-population . 
• Controversy arose around few of its underlying meanings- "we, the people of Iraq, of all 
components and across the spectrum, ..... decide freely and by choice to unite our 
59 
future ... " being subject to much of it. The Iraqi union being a voluntary decision 
according to those lines may have been inserted as a Kurdish agenda because it can imply 
right of secession.134 Even the history version of the preamble seems to favor Shiite and 
Kurdish interpretations of it. 135 Unlike the preamble of the Afghan constitution, it fails to 
specify objectives in clear and concise manner and omits promise of observing the United 
Nations charter and adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights136. 
Section 1: Basic Principles 
Article 1: Despite demands from Islamic groups in the drafting committee, and emphasis 
on religious traditions, the country's name was not changed into Islamic State of Iraq. 
. According to the first Article, the name remains "The Republic of Iraq" same as since the 
overthrow of the Monarchy in 1958137. This Article describes Iraq as a single federal, 
independent and a sovereign state with a republican, representative, parliamentary and 
democratic system of government. It also establishes the constitution as one of the 
guarantors of the unity of Iraq. It may, however, be interesting to follow whether the 
Course of Kurdish demand of a separate state derives strength from the preamble or faces 
significant challenge from this provision. 
134 
Nathan 1. Brown, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "The Final Draft of 
~e Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary" 
; Id 
136 
137 Preamble of Afghan Constitution promises observance of the UN Charter and respect for the UDHR. 




Article 2: This Article declares Islam to be the official religion of Iraq. Though majority 
of the population adhere to Islamic faith, Iraq had been avoiding religious connotations at 
the state level for a long time. It was hailed to be the only secular country in the religion-
dominated Middle East. Through this declaration Iraq not only lost its secular character 
but also opened the door of uncontested religious teachings at school, funding for 
religious institutions etc. 
This Article also bars enactment of any law that may contradict any established 
provision of Islamic law. This provision leaves the option of problematic interpretations 
of established provisions of Islamic law. For example, if the Iraqi parliament has a 
majority of Shiites who decide to follow Iranian interpretation of Islam; women may 
loose their right to be judges 138. Interestingly the next few provisions appear to contradict 
each other. They bar enactment of any law that may contradict principles of democracy 
and rights and freedoms stipulated in the constitution. It will be an interesting task for 
scholars to observe how the claim of Islam being 'a foundation source of legislation' 
plays out in this regard. Whether Islamic rules, democratic rights or constitutional 
freedoms will dominate future Iraqi citizens' lives, will depend on the interpretation of 
this Article. One breathing point, however, is that this provision does not have 
retrospective status, accordingly applying only to new legislation. It may still be a 
Concern if previous legislation is put forward for a judicial review and found to be 
unconstitutional under this provision. 
Center of a great deal of attention, this provision may seem contradictory in some 
respect but it may have little practical effect on existing Iraqi legal structure. 
138 
After the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, women judges lost their jobs; one of them being Noble 
Laureate Shirin Ebadi. 
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Article 3: Confirming with previous constitutions, this Article recognizes Iraq's multiple 
nationalities, religions and sects. Subject to many protests from the Sunni sectors, this 
provision fails to mention Iraq as an Arab state yet recognizing its binding 
responsibilities under the Charter of the Arab League. A constitutional expert calls this 
compromise 'ironic' as binding the country constitutionally to an international document 
like the Charter of the Arab League could have far more practical implications than 
allowing it to a symbolic status of Arab State139. 
Article 4: The Constitution stipulates both The Arabic and the Kurdish language to be the 
official languages of Iraq which involves recognizing rights including publication of the 
Official Gazette in both the languages, speeches, conversation and expression in official 
domains in either of the two languages, having bank notes, passports and stamps in either 
of the two languages etc. 
Other language groups like Turkomen, Assyrians and Armenian have also been awarded 
the right to be educated in their mother tongues. The Turkik and Syriac languages are 
also official languages in administrative units where these groups constitute density of 
population. The Constitution allows each region discretionary power to adopt other local 
: languages as official ones if people of that region approves of it in a regional referendum. 
Article 5 & 6: These two provisions reiterate the democratic pillars of the new Iraqi -
Constitution, "The people are the source of authority and legitimacy', they shall exercise 
authority through constitutional institutions and authority will be transferred through 
Nathan Brown, Article 3: Identity. 
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democratic means. Though they appear to be safeguards against hostile take over of the 
government, constitutional guarantees have never prevented revolutionaries, military 
leaders or terrorists from toppling a democratic government140• 
Article 7: The Constitution bans the Saddamist Ba'ath in Iraq, its symbols and other like 
organizations or programs that "adopts, incites, facilitates, glorifies, promotes or justifies 
racism or terrorism or accusations of being an infidel (takfir) or ethnic cleansing". There 
is no clear indication of prohibiting Ba'ath party ideology reintroducing itself under a 
different name. 
Article 8, 9: The constitution stipulates Iraq's observance of principles of good 
neighborliness, adherence of principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
states, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, respect for international obligations. 
Article 9 deals extensively with Iraqi armed forces, security services and intelligence 
services. The Constitution tries to keep the armed forces out of governing power by 
measures that include prohibiting their interference in political affairs and banning them 
from taking part in national election for public offices. This Article also goes to the heart 
ofthe alleged conflict by reiterating Iraq's obligations relating to the non-proliferation of 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. 
140 
For example, despite constitutional guarantees of a democratic government elected by the people, 
.. Bangladesh has suffered multiple military dictatorships between 1975 and 1982 during which the 
. Constitution remained suspended for the most part. 
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Article 13: This Article declares Constitution the supreme law of Iraq and stipulates that 
laws that contradict the constitution cannot be enacted. This provision may provide sense 
of security to Iraqis who think Kurds may want to override constitution and also to those 
who are worried about Islamic law prevailing over the Constitution. 
Section 2: Rights and Liberties 
In modern Constitutions, especially in the ones under profound western 
, 
influence 141 placing emphasis on the rights regime is a popular phenomenon. 
Safeguarding those rights or structural guarantees is not taken seriously. As a result many. 
Constitutions offer promising liberties without securing their enjoyment for the citizens. 
Similar thoughts may arise while reviewing the chapter 2 of Iraqi Constitution. 
The Constitution guarantees (notwithstanding with the exceptions) the following rights to 
Iraqi citizens among others: 
Civil and Political Rights 
1. Right to equality before the law without being discriminated on the grounds of 
gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, origin, color, religion, sect, belief or opinion, 
or economic or social status; 
2. Right to enjoy life, security and liberty; 
3. Right to equal opportunity; 
4. Right to privacy and protection of the sanctity of homes; 
141 
• . For example, consider the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh where numerous human 
• nghts have been awarded to citizens, the implementation of which are not duly supported or monitored by 
an effective infrastructure. 
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5. Right to Iraqi citizenship through father or mother, right to mUltiple citizenships 
except for special cases; 
6. Right to independent judiciary; litigation, public trials, defense lawyer at the 
expense of the state in cases of inability to pay, safeguard from unlawful detention 
etc; 
7. Right to participate in public affairs, vote, elect and run for office; 
8. Right not to be extradited; 
Economic, Social and Cultural Liberties 
1. Right to work; 
2. Right to enjoy, benefit, exploit and dispose of private property; 
3. Freedom of movement; 
4. Right to exemption from taxes for low income earners; 
5. Right to preservation of family, religious, moral and national values; 
6. Right to social and health security; 
7. Right to health care; 
8. Right of the handicapped to rehabilitation; 
9. Right to live in safe environmental conditions; 
10. Right to education with mandatory primary education; 
11. Right to practice sports; 
Liberties: 




2. Protection from extrajudicial imprisonment or investigation; 
3. Protection from psychological, physical torture and inhumane treatment; 
4. Protection from intellectual, political and religious coercion; 
5. Protection from forced labor, slavery, slave trade, trafficking and sex trade; 
6. Freedom of expression, press, printing, advertisement, media, publication, 
assembly, peaceful demonstration etc; 
7. Freedom to form and join associations and political parties; 
8. Right to avoid forceful subscription to any party, society or political party; 
9. Freedom of communication; 
10. Freedom of thought, conscience and belief; 
11. Freedom of practice of religious rites, worship etc 
12. Freedom of movement; 
Some guarantees of the Constitution can be hailed as progressive and 
complementary to internationally guaranteed rights, in many cases overcoming 
shortcomings of regional patterns. Offering Iraqi citizenship to children born from an 
Iraqi mother is a rare right available to Muslim especially Middle Eastern women around 
the world. There are other promising provisions as well For example, prohibition against 
economic exploitation of children, State's responsibility to rehabilitate the disabled and 
people with special needs, undertaking the duty to protect and preserve the environment, 
support for indigenous Iraqi cultural orientations, prohibition of torture- and inhumane 
treatment, prohibition of forced labor, slavery, trafficking of women and children, sex 
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trade etc, strengthening the role of civil society and support them in many ways, 
prohibiting tribal traditions violating human rights 142 etc. 
Similarly, some provisions may seem too conservative for world standards such as 
prohibition on expropriation of private property, restrictions on extradition and allowing 
political refugees to stay as long as they are not accused of international or terrorist 
crimes. In the last scenario, it is not clear if Iraq would entertain a warrant against a 
political asylum seeker from the ICC since it is not a signatory of the treaty. 
Few provisions may raise eyebrows as they deal with topics usually dealt with by , 
regularly elected government. The State undertakes to guarantee reform of the Iraqi 
economy in accordance with modem economic principles ensuring the full investment of 
its resources, diversification of its sources and the encouragement and development of the 
private sector without reserving exclusive government control over any sector of the 
economy. 
The common human rights guarantees in the Constitution seem to have inherent 
problems in them. The right to personal privacy is guaranteed so long as it does not 
contradict the rights of others and public moral/43 -without explaining the standard for 
determination of public morals. The freedom of communication in all its forms is subject 
to monitoring, wiretapping or disclosing for legal and security necessity and by a judicial 
decisionl44- a reminder of the Patriot Act in the USA in the aftermath of the Twin tower 
attack145. Public order and morality are conditions for the enjoyment of freedom of 
142 In many parts of the world women suffer from genital mutilation as part of cultural tradition. 
143 Article 17 
144 Article 40 
145 The Uniting and Straightening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) or Patriot Act of 2001 curtailed civil rights of citizens 
Significantly through surveillance. For a complete text of the ACT as revised in 2006 and official 
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expression as well as many basic rights. Critics point out that some basic freedoms have 
been left to be determined by law, a phrasing that many of Iraq's neighbors have turned 
. I h I 146 into gapmg oop 0 es . 
Last but not the least of the concerns is no where in the Constitution its mentioned 
how these rights and liberties are to be safeguarded, no structural guarantees are 
mentioned anywhere. 
Section 3: Federal Powers 
Federal legislative, executive and judicial powers are exercised on the basis of the 
principle of separation of powers. 
Legislative authority is vested In the Council of Representatives (COR) and 
Federation Council. The members of the COR, 1 in every 100,000, are elected through 
secret ballot representing different groups of the people of Iraq. The COR is also 
expected to host at least one fourth women members in its composition. The members 
elect the speaker and two of his deputies by absolute majority of the Council. The COR is 
empowered enact a law by two third majority of its members to establish the 'Federation 
Council' which includes representation from the regions and governorates that are not 
organized in a region. The COR also regulates the FCs formation, membership 
conditions, components and everything relevant to it. 
Among the powers of the COR, the following are noteworthy: 
• Enacting federal laws 
documents relating to that see US Department of Justice website at 
~P:I/www .lifeandliberty. gOY lindex. html 
Nathan Brown 
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• Monitoring the performance of the executive authority 
• Electing the President of the Republic 
• Regulating the process of ratification of international treaties and agreements 
• Impeaching the President by an absolute majority of members after he has 
been convicted by the Federal Supreme Court on the grounds of perjury of the 
Constitutional oath or violating the Constitution or high treason etc. 
Federal executive power is vested in the President of the Republic and the Council of 
Ministers. 
The President is the Head of the State and guarantees "the commitment to the 
Constitution and the preservation of Iraq's independence, sovereignty, unity, and the 
safety of its territories ... ,,147. The COR elects the President for four years. 
The nominee from the largest COR bloc forms the Council of Ministers (COM) within 15 
days from the election of the President. After the formation of the COM, it must gain the 
vote of confidence from the COR, individual Ministers and the ministerial program. As 
the direct executive authority, the Prime Minister deals with the general policy of the 
State and performs as the commander in chief of the armed forces at the same time. 
The Federal judicial power is independent and is comprised of many Federal courts 
including 
• The Higher Judicial Council 




• The Federal Court of Cassation 
• The Public Prosecution Department 
• The Judiciary Oversight Commission etc. 
The methods of establishment of these courts, their authorities and modes of 
operation are left in many instances to enactment of laws by the COR and not provided in 
the Constitution. The Higher Judicial Council manages the affairs of the Judiciary and 
supervises the Federal JUdiciary. Among its other responsibilities are presenting the 
nominations to the COR for the Chief Justice and members of the Federal Court of 
Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Oversight 
Commission and propose the draft of the annual budget of the Federal Judicial Authority 
To the COR. 
The crucial responsibility of interpreting the Constitution and overseemg the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations in effect lie with the Federal Supreme Court 
which is composed of experts in Islamic jurisprudence and legal scholars together with a 
number of judges. 
The Constitution prohibits laws stipulating immunity from appeal" for any 
. administrative action or decision. The Constitution provides for the establishment of 
independent commissions- the High Commission for Human Rights, the Independent 
Electoral Commission and the Commission on Public Integrity which are to be monitored 
" by the COR. There is also provision for a Martyrs' Foundation which is to be established 
and attached to the COM. 
4 of the Constitution deals with the powers of the Federal Government who is to 




democratic system" 148. The areas where the Federal government exercises exclusive 
authority include formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, 
signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; negotiating, signing and 
ratifying debt policies; formulating foreign sovereign economic and trade policy; 
formulating and executing national security policy; formulating fiscal and customs 
policy; drawing up the national budget of the state; formulating monetary policy; 
regulating issues of citizenship, naturalization, etc; planning policies relating to water 
sources from outside Iraq and its just distribution inside Iraq etc149. The policy regarding 
oil and gas management, the subject of much speculation, is to be determined by the 
federal government with the producing governorates and regional governments whereas 
people of Iraq are declared the owner of the asset in the Constitution 150. Several powers 
are shared between the federal government and regional authorities such as managing 
customs; regulating the main sources of electrical energy and its distribution; formulating 
environmental policy; formulating development and general planning policies; 
formulating public health policy; formulating the public educational and instructional 
policy and formulating and regulating internal water resources policy etc151 • Antiquities, 
archeological sites, cultural buildings, manuscripts, coins etc are regarded to be national 
treasures under the jurisdiction of the federal government and are managed in cooperation 
with the authorities of regions and governorates. 152The Constitution leaves a loophole in 
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belonging to the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and 
governorates that are not organized in a region. I53 
Section five of the Constitution sets out the framework for regional powers. The 
Iraqi Federal system is described to be made up of a decentralized capital, regions and 
governorates as well as local adrninistrations. 154 At the moment Kurdistan is the only 
region existing in Iraq and recognized by the Constitution as SUCh. I55 The establishment 
of regions is regulated by the law the COR created within six months of its first session. 
Kurdistan and other regions that may form in accordance with the prescribed law are 
required to adopt their own Constitutions which will define the "structure of powers of 
the region, its authorities and the mechanisms for exercising such authorities" without 
contradicting the federal Constitution.I56 Kurdistan and all future regions are entitled to 
the right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with the 
federal Constitution as long as it does not overlap with the exclusive authority allowed to 
the federal government; right to an equitable share of the national revenues considering 
their resources, needs and percentage of their population; right to establish and organize 
internal security forces of the region etc. 157 
Iraq has 18 governorates which are made up of districts, sub districts and Villages. 
The formation of the Governorate Council and the governor as well as their powers is 
determined by the law enacted by the COR. The Constitution takes a step ahead of many 
. 153 
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as it guarantees the administrative, political, cultural and educational rights of various 
minority nationalities namely Turkomen, Chaldeans, and Assyrians etc. 158 
Section 6 of the Constitution holds the final and transitional provisions. It is safe to 
assume that amendment of the Constitution is discouraged as the requirement suggest. 
The President and the COM collectively or the one fifth of the COR members may 
propose an amendment. Fundamental principles and the rights and liberties awarded in 
the Constitution may not be amended by the first two elected federal governments. At the 
third term, the proposal to amend must be approved by two-thirds of the COR members, 
passed in a general referendum by the people and ratified by the President of the 
Republic within seven days. 159 All other provisions may be amended without the 
prohibition on first two terms following the same approval process of the COR, people 
and the President. What may prove to be controversial in terms of Kurdistan is the 
Constitutional safeguard against taking powers away from the regions that are not 
exclusively awarded to the federal government except where the legislative authority of 
the region approves such decision and the people of the region ratifies it. The 
Constitution guarantees all existing laws at the time of the Drafting of the Constitution to 
be in force unless annulled or amended in accordance with the Constitution. 160 
The last few provisions of the Constitution deal with the transitional provisions. Among 
the unique features are care for the families of the martyrs, political prisoners and victims 
of the Saddam regime; compensation for the families of the martyrs and the injured 
158 Art' 
I Icle 125 
59 Art' I Icle 126 
60 Article 130 
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victims of terrorist acts. 161 This special feature fails to mention victims of terrorism and 
armed intervention during the transitional phase. 
Dissecting the process of Constitution Making 
Gone are the days of traditional Constitution making also referred to as 'old 
Constitutionalism 'where few elite members of a society prescribes their view points on 
the future of a society, its perceived virtue being "Constitution making as an act of 
completion,,162. In the 21 st Century, Constitution making is not limited to a few members 
of a society; it has almost become the mandate of any democratic society to involve its 
population in what is known as 'participatory Constitution making'. To meet the 
challenges of modem societies facing ethnic violence, economic liberalization, and 
globalization in general, constitutions must not only include the pillars of legal and social 
institutions within a country but also take into account people's opinion of it. This new 
Constitutionalism is both international and comparative in nature in the sense that they 
involve experts from around the world and derive from experiences of other communities 
like never before in the history of constitution making 163 . Constitutions created 
confirming to this new process have been called merely 'constructed' rather than 
'designed,l64It is debatable which mode of Constitution making is more successful 
16, Art. 
, Icle 132 I:: Democratic Constitution Making: Vivian Hart, Special USIP Report, p 2 
. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes, in Andrew Reynolds, ed., The 
re-chitecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, And Democracy (2002), p 15 
. Id p 16 
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between the two but it may be agreeable that" the process does move incrementally 
closer to the needs of the present day" 165 
International law has long advocated for people's participation in the political 
processes and public affairs of their country166. The Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights further stressed the right recognized in Article 25 of ICCPR, " Peoples 
have the right to freely determine their political status and to enjoy the right to choose the 
form of their constitution and governmenC167 
Where drafting a Constitution is a difficult undertaking for any country, the Iraqi 
attempt of participatory Constitution making met with multiple challenges doing the 
same. The complex mosaic of ethnic religious composition of Iraqi society, post-conflict 
reconstruction measures, presence of foreign troops posed as hurdles for the drafters. 
They fought to introduce a document that could unify different groups under the 'Iraqi 
nationality' theme as well as to rebuild a state structure destroyed by over two decades of 
authoritarian rule. The main points of consideration were 
• Introducing democratic state rule 
• Unifying different ethnic-religious groups 
• Establish human rights regime & state structures for safeguarding the same 
• Facilitating the growth of civil society 
165 Democratic Constitution Making: Vivian Hart, Special USIP Report, p 2 
. 166 Article 21 ,of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 25 of the International Covenant on 
CiVil and Political Rights; Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Political Rights; Article 5.2 of 
the Commonwealth Harare Declaration; Article 7.2 of the Asian Human Rights Charter; Article 6 of the 
f~ter American Democratic Charter all advocate for people's participation in state's political framework. 
"The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service," 
General Comment, Office ofthe High Commissioner for Human Rights, No.25, 1996 at Para.2. Retrieved 




As predicted by experts, " The efforts to overcome these hurdles and find common 
ground among Iraqi political interests will occur in the context of a lack of democratic 
history in Iraq and the absence of suitable regional models,,168 the drafting process met 
with severe shortcomings. 
Political Will: 
Recent examples of Cambodia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor & 
Afghanistan suggest that international community or foreign powers playa great role in 
post conflict constitution making as part of their roles in the conflict resolution. With the 
agenda of an early exit from the territory international community involved may advocate 
a "simple procedure involving a comparatively small number of stake holders and a 
narrow agenda" rather than a procedure that includes a large number of individuals and 
groups discussing a wider agenda169. It can be argued that same interests dominated the 
case of Iraq. Though Iraqi National Congress (mostly comprised of formerly exiled 
Iraqis), the Kurdish political parties and the formerly exiled Shi'a community released 
their versions of draft constitutions aspiring a democratic Iraq. The views of the majority 
of Iraq's population not being publicly available make room for the speculation of 
whether they had been consulted at all. Among these views, the Kurdish one can be 
credited as comprising the opinions of majority, which is representative of only 15-20% 
of Iraqis. Though all the proposals demanded fully democratic Iraq, they varied in the 
format of expected federalism. The INC draft called for a heavily centralized· federalism; 
168 
Establishing a stable democratic constitutional structure in Iraq: Some basic considerations, report by 
PUblic International Law and Policy Group and the Century Foundation, May 2003, page 2, retrieved from 
~~P:I/www.pilpg.org 
Ghai, Yash, Lattimer, M. & Said, &Y. "Building Democracy in Iraq," Minority Rights Group 
International Report, United Kingdom, 2003 at 27 
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the Shi'a segment mentioned federalism only in its broadest sense in a unified Iraq and 
the Kurdish proposal advocated an equal power sharing between Kurdish and Arab 
provinces at the federal level. The compromise is a federal government where the 
Kurdish region enjoys important powers with many fundamental authorities remaining 
with the federal government.170 From the process described by numerous sources, it is 
apparent that the political will of the elites dominated the constitution making process 
where the common people experienced everyday bloodbath in the aftermath of the Iraq 
occupation. 
Participatory Constitution making: 
In post Saddam Iraq, the Iraqi media, exile political voices, existing interested parties 
together with US administration and the UN shared an understanding that the first 
reconstructive effort in Iraq should be establishing constitutional democracy. This 
enthusiasm may be compared with the situation in Afghanistan, a country with rather 
'remarkable history of constitutional activism ,171. Unlike its 7 other constitutions since 
1923, the constitution of 2004 emerged from a participatory process trying to uphold 
national unity in a multi ethnic state in post conflict situation. The expectation of Afghan 
people of a participatory process rose because of the UN involvement after the fall of 
Taliban and progressive language of the Bonn Agreement. 172The international 
community involvement had a similar effect on Iraqi population. The pressure from Iraqi 
shiia leader Grand Ayatollah Sistani successfully resisted a Constitution by US 
170 
For more on this see the Report n 165 
I7i The Role of Constitution Building Processes in Democratization, International Idea Report, 2004; 
f7etrieved from http://www.idea.intfconflictfcbp/;page6 
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appointees as ambitioned by the Coalition Provisional Authority 173Confirrning with 
present trend of participatory constitution making, the TAL hinted on a transparent 
drafting process. Article 60 of the TAL stipulates that in writing the draft of the 
permanent constitution for Iraq, the NA shall be responsible for "encouraging debate on 
the constitution through regular general public meetings in all parts of Iraq and through 
the media, and receiving proposals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes the 
constitution.,,174 The Security Council joined the appeal in resolution 1546 where it 
mandated the special Representative of the Secretary General and UNAMI on the request 
of the Iraqi government to play a leading role to "promote national dialogue and 
consensus-building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people of Iraq,,175. 
The demand for public participation got momentum among other interested parties 
because of the non-transparent and secretive process that the CPA applied in drafting the 
TAL. In their focus group report published in June 'OS, the NDI stated that among the 
Iraqi men and women citizen participation is seen as important and the Iraqis wanted 
their voice to be heard 176. 
173 USIP Report Page 5, retrieved from http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr155.pdf; Accessed on 
29th November, 2006 
174 Article 60 of the TAL retrieved from http://www.cpa-irag.org/governmentITAL.html. Accesses on 29th 
November, 2006 
175 SClRES/1546 (2004); Retrieved from 
h..ttp:lldaccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GENIN04/381116IPDFIN0438116.pdf?OpenElement; Accessed on 
29th November, 2006 
176 Iraqi Voices: Public Attitudes and Political Opportunity in Transition, Findings from Focus Groups with 
Iraqi Men and Women (Conducted April 13-15, 2005); National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs. P-9. Retrieved from http://www.accessdemocracy.orgllibraryIl921 ig focus groups 060105.pdf, 
Accessed on 29 November, 2006 
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Iraqi Constitution Drafting Committee: 
Iraqi transitional government that exercised authority over Iraq from 3rd May '05 to 20th 
May '06 appointed members of the Iraqi Constitutional drafting committee to draft a new 
constitution for post conflict Iraq. 
The members by political affiliation were: 
United Iraqi Alliance - 28 
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan - 15 
The Iraqis - 8 
Communist Party of Iraq - 1 
Iraqi Turkmen Front - 1 
National Rafidain List - 1 
Sunni Arab nominee - 1 (later expanded to 15) 
Iraqi Sunni groups comprising about 15-20% of the total population boycotted 
2005 election on the grounds that it was heavily under US influence. They however 
expressed interest in participating in the Constitution drafting process only to be included 
in the process by late July '05. In a similar situation, the Afghan Constitutional 
COmmittee created by a Presidential decree in October '02 consisted of 9 experts 
including 2 women. I77 After this committee presented a draft in March '03, the President 
created a review commission of 35 members of whom seven were women consisting of 
legal experts, tribal leaders, religious scholars, professionals, academics and community 
177 
Idea Report p 13 
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Timeline: 
Guided by the Bonn agreement178 and its promise of participatory Constitution making to 
heal Afghan wounds, four different phases were adopted to introduce a new Constitution. 
The adoption of the Constitution at the Loya Jirga179 was preceded by an initial drafting 
process, consultation with interested parties, revision of the draft and final debate18o. In 
case of Iraq the concerned authority was allowed very little time for the drafting process. 
The TAL required the NA to complete the drafting process by August 15, '05 unless it 
appeals to the Presidency Council for an extension of maximum six months with the 
approval of majority of the members181 . As pointed out by USIP, "The US Government's 
strong demarches stand out as the principal reason for the Assembly ultimately declining 
the TAL extension provision on August 1,,182. Though it is doubtful whether the drafting 
committee, facing resignations, walkouts by Sunni Arabs, Kurdish and other 
representatives over their differences over federal arrangements would have been able to 
utilize any extended period to its benefit, compressed timeframe affected many issues. 
1780n December 5,2001 a few weeks after the US a~d its allies toppled Afghan Taliban Government the 
'Bonn agreement' was signed among representatives of various Afghan factions under the auspices of 
Special representative of the UN Secretary General to decide the course of Afghanistan's future. Full 
agreement can be retrieved at http://www.un.orglNews/dhllatestlafghanlafghan-agree.htm . 
179 Traditionally Loya Jirga in Afghanistan is meant to refer to meetings of religious, political and 
government leaders belonging to different tribes to decide on important issues. In this case, /loya Jirga 
refers to the 502 elected and appointed delegates to consider the Afghan Constitution in 2003. 
180 p 12 
181 Article 61 A & 61 F of the TAL, retrieved from http://www.cpa-irag.org/governmentlTAL.html, 
Accesses on 29 November, 2006 
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There was not enough time to understand Sunni Arab groups' objection to 
federalism and their concerns of it leading to divided Iraq and civil war. Looking at 
today's reality of widespread sectarian violence, the importance of that step is well felt. 
As the Sunni groups got involved very late in the drafting process, there was little time to 
prepare for a useful dialogue on the issues. The negotiations as well as the drafting 
process as a whole suffered from this. 
International Involvement: 
The timeframe also did not allow the UN and international experts either to mediate the 
negotiations or to provide informative inputs from around the world to the benefit of the 
process. The UNAMI led by Nicholas Haysom got involved only in June after being 
invited by the Iraqi Govt. USIP brought in Constitutional expert Yash Ghai 183 who 
referred extensively to comparative constitutional models explaining that "federalism far 
from precipitating the break up of the state, in fact might hold Iraq together,,184. Both of 
these valuable resources failed to leave useful impact on the process because of the short 
timeframe. After the NA denied request for an extension of the framing period, the US 
administration got directly involved in the drafting phase only to increase resentment 
within the Sunni groups. On August 12, the US Embassy went as far as circulating their 
version of a Constitution for Iraq 185. The visibility of US influence on the draft 





185 P 15 
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International presence was felt in Afghanistan Constitution making through 
funding, substantive advice and space availability by the United Nations and few other 
foreign entities186. World-renowned constitutional experts Guy Carcassonne, Yash Pal 
Ghai and Barnett Rubin were present and assisted the process significantly yet "The 
process has not been in any way akin to that of foreigners writings and nationals rubber 
stamping a new Constitution,,187. 
Representation of Groups: 
Though civil society organizations were able to raise their points but they did not leave 
adequate influence on the draft because of the lack of institutional framework. Iraq 
. foundation for Development and Democracy188, a well reputed organization proposed an 
independent Constitutional Commission to work alongside the official one and raise civil 
society views. The Thaqalayn Research Institute a Shiia religious NGO created a forum 
to educate religious Shiia community on the value of constitutionalism and bring its 
views to the Commission.189 Both these initiatives along with others failed to represent 
the civil society views in a useful manner. 
Participation of Women: 
The drafting committee had Six Women members and did not pay much attention to 
women's groups' demands with regards to the draft Constitution. In a statement released 
by Iraqi Women's Network on July 21 '05, concerns are expressed that none of the issues 
186 
Afghan Report p 23 
187 P23 
188 Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy is a regional non governmental organization that 
s\upports dialogue between decision-makers and citizens on different issues of national interest. 
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that this group discussed with the sub committee of chapter on rights, duties and liberties 
were taken into consideration 190. The group even complained of the reception they got 
from the committee, "At the beginning of the meeting they tried to prevent us from 
reading our memo under the pretext of shortage of time! The meeting was held upon our 
request and we're astonished of a good number of Islamist women have been invited to 
attend it as an attempt to confuse the meeting. It was the first opportunity for us as 
representing active part of the civil society orgs to meet with the sub-drafting committee. 
We've expressed our worry about very short time behind the drafting committee to 
accomplish its work in a close door,,191 
In the Afghanistan scenario women were reasonably represented, forming approximately 
one fifth of the delegates and assuming position of authority192 
Participation by common people: 
.. The Constitutional committee, National Assembly and the leadership council always met 
in high security areas practically making it impossible for general public to participate. 
The Constitutional Committee secretariat was to house an outreach unit for disseminating 
. information regarding the constitution and receiving public feedback. Lack of office 
space, delay in hiring staff led the unit only to release a 7 point questionnaire. Within the 
limited time, they were able to receive 150,000 submissions, 20,000 of which came 
Kurdish region and 10,000 from Sunnis of Falujah193. Even this limited outreach 
WHRnet Resource, Retrieved from http://www. whrnet.org/fundamentalisms/docs/action-iraq-sitin-
n;---<..~."c,' Accessed on 29th November, 2006 
Afghanistan Report. P 25 
USIP report 19 
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activity had no effect in the drafting process as by April 13 the committee had a draft 
version ready before the outreach committee prepared a report194• 
Unlike the Iraqi situation, the Afghan Constitutional Commission had a public 
education unit, which began to operate in May 2003. Regional offices helped 
campaigning , on the significance of a constitution for Afghanistan, with an overview of 
past constitutions, the on-going constitution making process, the importance of people's 
views, and the impact on their lives,]95. This campaign is claimed to have reached all 32 
provinces and refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan 196. Public consultation followed the 
education phase during June and July '03197 . The consultation was carried out through 
meetings where possible and by distributing questionnaires among people. 
Approximately 532 meetings were attended by as many as 150,000 Afghans whereas 
80,000 to 100,000 questionnaires were received 1 98. After a final joint review by the 
Review Commission and National Security Council consisting of select numbers of the 
ministry of defense, foreign affairs, the interior and the justice; a draft constitution was 
released on November 3rd, '03 for consideration by the Afghan people and Loya Jirga. On 
the 22nd day of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, a Constitution was adopted unanimously 
194
Id 
195 Id P 14 
196
Id 
197 Without any actual draft of the constitution how this consultation helped the process is doubtful. Under 
criticism from media and public in general, the CC promised to explain how people's views were taken into 
cl0nsideration but failed to do so. P 15 
98
Id 




Enthusiasts described the referendum as, " ... a civilized step that puts Iraq on the path to 
democracy, to rebuilding our new Iraq.200n Enthusiasm flew high as the Constitution got 
approval from 79 % of Iraqi voters on October 15th. Voters in Sunni majority areas 
overwhelmingly rejected the proposal whereas the Shiites and Kurds supported it 
indicating signals of 'political polarization,201 in Iraq. Even though the United Nations 
expressed concerns over the rules of referendum being changed without proper 
representation in the Parliament, they did not find enough evidence to oppose the results. 
The rules stipulated that simple majority 'yes' votes from registered voters would pass 
the measure if two thirds of registered voters in at least three provinces would not vote 
'no' 202 
Conclusion: 
After more than a year of the referendum adopting the Constitution, looking back at the 
process and substance of the document is painful. Iraq is in civil war and more divided 
than it ever appeared to be in history. Did it meet any of the criterions mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper? The answer is no-it did not clarify the authority of state officials, 
200 Independent Electoral Commission spokesman Farid Ayar at a new conference on October 25,2005; 
retrieved from 
h!tp://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=10000087&sid=amqz7dZlEx3w&refer=top world news on 
12/12/06 
201 "Results of the referendum have indicated the degree of political polarization in Iraq," the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq said in an e-mailed statement in which it also praised Iraqis for turning 
out to vote. "This poses an ongoing challenge for all Iraqis and underscores the importance of an inclusive 
national dialogue." Id 
202 Article 4 of the 'Law on the Referendum on the Constitution' stipulated the rules for the referendum. 
Later VOA news agency reported that an amendment was passed in the Parliament with only half of its 
members present and how Kurdish and Shiites lawmakers tried to ensure the language to be 'registered 
Voters' rather than 'total voters'. http://www.voanews.comlenglishlarchive/2005-1 0/2005-1 0-05-
~3.cfm?CFID=I1314358&CFTOKEN=71539737, retrieved on 12112/06 
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failed to build focused claim on sovereignty and left most part of institution building to 
the legislature. 
The mostly criticized provision of the Constitution is probably its institution of 
federalism. Unexplained, not properly defined claim of a federal government raises 
questions about the unity of Iraq. The powers awarded to Kurdistan indirectly through 
regional mask may very well lead to division of the country. As 'under the impetus of 
globaiisation, migrations, rights consciousness, gender politics, powers of imitation, and 
suffering, the question of diversity has forced itself on politicians and policy makers, and 
the international community203, this Constitution does nothing to preserve the common 
vision of a unified Iraq. Allowing regional power over natural resources revenues create 
more chaos than it solves. Creation of an undefined federalism where many important 
institutions are left to the creation of legislatures, power sharing between the central and 
regional government that particularly benefits one segment of Iraqi society as well as lack 
of common vision added to the sectarian violence that is a everyday reality in Iraq today. 
Islam has been awarded an important place in Iraqi legal and social structure 
through this Constitution. Depending on the interpretation of the legislative branch, it 
may turn into another Middle Eastern country degrading women's position in the society. 
The process of Constitution making for Iraq has not been an ideal one. The 
COmmittee worked within a very short time, could not engage one of the largest segments 
of Iraqi society and lacked proper representation from civil society including women's 
203 
Yash Ghai, 'A Journey around constitutions: Reflecting on Contemporary Constitutions', p 11 retrieved 
from http://www.idea.intJconflictJcbp/uploadljourney.pdf on 2006/12/5 
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groups. The undeniable US influence over the process had added a flavor almost 
comparable to the colonial constitutions.204 
What could be done now? The notion of Constitutional review has emerged in 
important forums. The issues that have been 'swept under the rug during the drafting 
phase,205 must be dealt with now. Sharing power in terms of governance, revenue sharing 
in oil and taxation are matters that must be reconsidered. 
The Constitution building exercise in Iraq may serve as caution for any society 
trying to rush into a magic framework that will provide post conflict solutions for a multi 
ethnic country. As for the wronged, Constitutional review together with education of the 
common people leading to their informed approval of it must be secured. Failure to 
revisit the needs of Iraqi society and offer adequate framework for it will meet with 
undesirable future for the region and the world at large. 
Putting the criticisms aside, it must be noted that initiating the complex task of 
constitution making in a country that was under authoritarian rule for longer than most of 
its citizens have lived is an achievement in itself. The culture of participating in 
government decision-making once introduced will mature and offer true democracy to its 
citizens. 
204 'The economic interest is overriding, although it finds little expression in the constitution-which is 
deSigned to give maximum discretion to the legislature and the executive-', Ghai, N 76 p4 
205 Kofi Annan, BBC interview 2006.12.06 
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Chapter IV 
Iraqi Women: The captives of Democracy 
88 
Introduction: 
"To disregard women and bar them from active participation in political, social, 
economic and cultural life would in fact be tantamount to depriving the entire population 
of every society of half its capability. The patriarchal culture and the discrimination 
against women, particularly in the Islamic countries, cannot continue for ever,,206. 
In most societies of the world, women are the most disadvantageous groups among 
all. Poverty, famine, natural calamities as well as lack of development in legal and social 
segments affect women more gravely than their male counterparts. In a peaceful 
environment of a country, women are constantly struggling for their equal rights to state 
resources and for adequate legal protection from violence and discrimination. In a 
country caught between post conflict rebuilding and civil war situation, the challenges of 
survival and empowerment for women are far greater. The fact of a temporary 
government making important decisions regarding issues that will make significant 
impact on Iraq's future policy towards women made the situation even more complex. 
The story of Iraqi women is tragic if not horrifying. Under political repression and 
international sanctions they have tried to thrive for decades; ironically it's democracy 
that's threatening their potentials as human beings as well as survival. This chapter 
purports to communicate the roles played by the transitional authority in dealing with the 
"woman question" in Iraq. I look at issues that women in Iraq face today in the context of 
-
Transitional authority including Survival in its very basic sense; legal status and 
. protection; political participation in the reconstruction effort; and plight during the 
206 Shirin Ebadi's Nobel peace prize acceptance speech, 2003, retrieved from 
!mp:llnobelprize.orglnobel prizes/peacellaureates/2003/ebadi-Iecture-e.html on December 23, 2006. 
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conflict and justice afterwards etc. For a fruitful discussion, I take into account 
constitutions of Iraq from different periods, acceptance of international legal standards, 
reports from international and local non governmental organizations as well as personal 
accounts of prominent scholars. Most of the secondary sources I refer to for this section 
belong to the 'feminist jurisprudence' category. My preference to this particular. area of 
scholarship stem from my own interest in feminism and it was only natural that I found 
these writings more agreeable than others. This chapter is divided into three parts. First I 
look at the situation of women existing prior to 2003 as found in the legal structures and 
international texts. Then I investigate the current situation and changes both positive and 
negative as brought about by the transitional authority taking into consideration 
comparative analysis with the Afghan administration. Lastly I voice my concerns and put 
forward recommendations referring to international legal standards. 
Iraqi Women: Prior to 2003 
Legal status: Women have played important roles in Iraqi society throughout history. 
The interim Constitution of 1958, which was drafted after the Iraqi revolution of July 
14th, 1958,207 awarded women equal status to men. The revolution changed the marriage, 
inheritance and divorce laws along with many others and made them subject to the 
jurisdiction of civil courts instead of Islamic family matters208. The early years of 
Baathist socialism saw women's status and rights further enshrined in legal 
207 1958 revolution 
208 Dr. Shakir Hanish, The July 14th 1958 Revolution in Iraq, retrieved from 




infrastructures. The Constitution of 1970 awarded women equality before the law209 , 
equal opportunities in the society21O, free education up to university levee 11 , right to 
work212, right to hold public offices213 as well as right to maternal and child care through 
the state214. As a result of these progressive steps, during Saddam Hussein's rule, "Iraqi 
women were widely considered to be among the most educated and professional women 
in the Arab world,,?15 According to reports of The Iraqi Bureau of Statistics in 1976, 
women constituted approximately 38.5 percent of those in the education profession, 31 
percent of the medical profession, 25 percent of lab technicians, 15 percent of 
accountants and 15 percent of civil servants?16. 
The situation of Iraqi women in the professional and state sectors, who had enjoyed the 
highest literacy rate in the regIOn before 1991 changed dramatically after the UN 
sanctions217 came into operation. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to UN mandated 
armed intervention in Iraq causing severe consequences for women in all parts of their 
lives. Together with women's education and work opportunities suffered family lives 
when number of widows increased significantly. According to a report by UNESCO, the 
literacy rate among women plunged down to less than 25% in 2001 from a 87% in 1987. 
209 Article 19 of 1970 Constitution; retrieved from http://www.iedc-
iq.org/englishlpaper.php?source=akbar&mlf=interpage&sid=lO195 on December 28,2006 
210 Id 
211 Article 27, 1970 constitution 
212 Article 32, 1970 constitution, a 1974 government decree further stipulated that all university graduates, 
male and female will be employed automatically. 
213 Article 30, 1970 constitution 
214 Art· I 1 9 0 .. IC e 1, 1 7 constitutIOn 
215 DNlFEM Gender Profile- Iraq, retrieved from http://www.womenwarpeace.org/iraq/iraq.htmon 
December 28, 2006 
~16 Rassam, "Political Ideology and Women in Iraq," p 87 cross posted from HRW report 
17 In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq by Security 
Council Resolution 661. SIRES/661(1990) 
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Women's advantageous status under the Constitution suffered a set back when then 
leader Saddam Hussein introduced anti women legislation for gaining support from the 
conservative groups of Iraq. In 1990 such a presidential decrees granting immunity to 
men guilty of committing honor crimes218 claimed almost 4000 lives of women?19 
Political Participation: 
Since 1958 women in Iraq have regularly participated in state responsibilities though in 
few numbers. There was a vibrant civil society including number of women's 
organizations prior to the secular Baath party's rule in 196822°. Instead of allowing civil 
society groups to thrive General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) was created and it 
ran more than 200 urban and rural community centers throughout Iraq offering job 
trainings, educational and other social programs221 . Though different groups have argued 
that the GFIW had been merely an arm of the oppressive Iraqi government and did not 
represent the struggle of Iraqi women222, the organization and its officers played a 
significant role in implementing state policy and lobbying for changes in the legal 
system. Iraqi women got the right to vote and run for office in 1980 even though they 
continued to be ill represented in state offices. In the first parliamentary election women 
Won 16 seats followed by 33 seats in the next election in a 250-member councit223. 
218 Honor killing is a practice prevalent in many societies of the world mostly among Muslim popUlation 
where a person may be killed by a family member without legal implications where the victim is accused of 
bringing shame to her family. Women are the primary prey for honor crimes but some men also fall victim 
to this custom. According to United Nations Populations Fund, annually about 5000 women are murdered 
by their relatives for 'Honor' around the world. 
219 Unifem Gender Profile, Article 111 of Iraqi Penal Code granted immunity for honor crimes. 
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Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Gulf war of 1991 and Saddam Hussein's growing dependence 
on religious groups' support caused women to suffer severe setback in their lives during 
1990s. Along with the return of Islamic personal laws, single sex education system 
instead of co education women were encouraged to return to their traditional roles as 
home keepers. Legislation was also introduced to restrict women's work outside their 
homes and curtailing their right to mObility224. Politically women participated less than 
before, only amounting to 8% of total members in the council in 2003225. They faced 
arbitrary arrests or imprisonment regularly for belonging to opposition groups, refusing to 
join or attend Baath Party meetings or simply for the purposes of intimidating male 
family members. 
Social Status: 
"For women of low-income classes within urban areas or poor women living in the 
countryside sheer survival has become the main aim of their lives. There is no doubt about the 
fact that it is particularly the poor mothers whose children are more likely to become yet 
another statistic in the incredibly high child mortality rates or who suffer from disease and 
malnutrition. Yet even for educated women who were part of the broad and well-off middle-
classes of Iraq, feeding their children has become the major worry and focus,,226. 
During the 90s Iraqi women did not only loose their previous educational and 
professional positions but also faced basic survival challenges. To add to the misery of 
224 HRW reported that women under the age of forty five were prohibited to leave Iraq without being 
accompanied by a male relative. 
225 UNIFEM Gender Profile 
226 'women, gender relations and Sanctions in Iraq', Nadje AI-Ali retrieved from 





growing divorce, domestic violence227 and polygamy rates, women were deprived from 
any family planning methods leading to abandonment of unwanted children because of 
lack of food. Prostitution grew both inside and in neighboring countries228 . Beheading of 
women became a common phenomenon in the early 2000 primarily aiming to combat 
prostitution229. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) by 2000 Iraqis comprised the second largest refugee groups after Afghans230 
with a significant number of women and children. 
The Survival Strategy: 
Despite deteriorating economic, security and social conditions women tried to cope with 
the new realities. Informal grassroots business, women's organizations particularly in the 
Kurdistan flourished and worked towards improving living situations for women231 . The 
exile women communities have been active throughout the Saddam regime in protesting 
and letting the world know about the plight of women in Iraq. 
227 Though since 1991 till the occupation, no fact finding mission had been allowed inside Iraq, UNICEF 
cautioned that it was " .. probable that incidents of domestic violence have increased in conjundtion with 
economic austerity" ; " Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Iraq" UNICEF, 1998 p 100. 
228 In her Article Nadje Ali comments that legislation restricting women's movements without male 
relatives came about after Jordan complained about increased rate of prostitution by Iraqi women in its 
territory. 
229 International Federation for Human Rights and Human Rights Alliance France, " Iraq: an intolerable, 
forgotten and unpunished repression", 2000 p23 retrieved from 
http://www.fidh.orglmagmoyenirapport/2002/iq315a.pdfonJanuary42007.This report estimated the 
number of beheaded women in the period of June 2000-Apri12001 as between 60 to 2000. Though the 
punishment was aimed at prostitutes, beheading had been used to repress any hint of opposion to the 
government. -
230 FIDH report, p 5. The report also mentioned the number of refugees being 580,000 in Iran, between 
120,000-300,000 in Jordan, 27000 in Syria, between 5000-7000 in Saudi Arabia, more than 2500 in 
Lebanon and 1500 in Pakistan. 300,000 Christians are also believed to be expatriate and the number of 
internally displaced people is approximately a million. 
231 For example, in semi-autonomous Kurdistan about 400 learning centers were established for adolescent 
girls, conferences were organized calling for more participation from women at all levels of society and 





In the Occupied Territories 
It is unpleasant truth that with the occupation of Iraq, which is being largely justified on 
the arguments of gross human right violations, rape rooms and ill treatment of women by 
the Saddam government, Iraqi women have remained the same and deteriorated from 
their previous positions in many segments of society. Beginning from the CPA rule 
continuing till the elected government, women's rights were sacrificed in favor of gaining 
political support in the eyes of the powerful religious groups. The opportunity to create 
an exemplary democracy with equal participation from women in the Middle East has 
been traded off over popularity gain with the religious conservatives. 
As Birgitte Sorensen suggests, "Women's main concerns in relation to post-war 
reconstruction can be summarized in the following two questions: Will the emerging 
political system recognize and protect women's rights and interests? And will women be 
enabled to influence and participate in the political process ?,,232 I look at each of the 
transitional authority in Iraq to paint a picture of neglecting and in many cases 
overlooking the issue of women in Iraqi society. 
CPA: 
DUring the CPA administration, the first constitutional document to govern occupied Iraq 
was drafted. The 24 member constitutional committee appointed by the occupyirig forces 
was responsible for drafting the interim constitution and the task did not involve any 
232 Birgitte Sorensen, Women and post conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Resources, WSP Occasional 
Paper No 3, 1998 P 13 
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women member. The affirmation of the Preamble thus falls short of its promise233 • The 
document uses improper terms to describe unity of Iraqi people234, makes religious tenets 
superior to law235 , and fails to recognize legal and social discrimination against women 
among the vestiges of the fallen regime. 236 Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the 
document for women in Iraq was to condition equality of women before law237 subject to 
Islamic interpretation by mentioning Islam as a source of legislation and the superior 
authority over enacted rules during the transitional period. These provisions had far 
reaching effect beyond the CPA and in the permanent constitution; many of these 
discriminatory features were reproduced. Though the CPA appointed Iraqi Governing 
Councie38, a 25 member provisional government, was largely accountable to the CPA 
they managed to pass a Directive that transformed the family law according to Islamic 
provisions. Despite conflicting reports from Human rights groups, the CPA claimed 
233 The TAL preamble affirms Iraq's respect for international law which entails upo~ a state responsibility 
to engage its women in political processes along with many other rights. For example, Fourth World 
Conference on Women 1995 recommended measures for countries to take to enhance women's 
participation in politics and decision making through the Beijing Platform for Action. The 1979 Convention 
on the Elimination of all sorts of Discrimination Against Women, of which Iraq is a state party requires 
states to eliminate discrimination in women's political participation through legal and special measures 
(Article 2-Article 4), take all necessary measures to eliminate discrimination in all segments of public life 
(Article 7). 
234 Preamble states " ... have endeavored at the same time to preserve the unity of their homeland in a spirit 
of fraternity and solidarity in order to draw the features of the future new Iraq, ... " 
235 Article 3 of TAL states, " .. no amendment may be made that could abridge in any way the rights of the 
Iraqi people cited in Chapter Two; extend the transitional period beyond the timeframe cited in this Law; 
delay the holding of elections to a new assembly; reduce the powers of the regions or governorates; or 
affect Islam, or any other religions or sects and their rites." 
236 The Iraqi Transitional Government shall take effective steps to end the vestiges of the oppressive acts of 
the previous regime arising from forced displacement, deprivation of citizenship, expropriation of financial 
assets and property, and dismissal from government employment for political, racial, or sectarian reasons. 
237 Article 7 A states, "Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source of 
legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or 
the rights cited in Chapter Two of this Law may be enacted during the transitional period" defeating the 
promise in Article 12 that reads, "All Iraqis are equal in their rights without regard to gender, sect, opinion, 
belief, nationality, religion, or origin, and they are equal before the law. Discrimination against an Iraqi 
citizen on the basis of his gender, nationality, religion, or origin is prohibited. Everyone has the right to 
life, liberty, and the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his life or liberty, except in 
accordance with legal procedures. All are equal before the courts." . 
238 The CPA established a Governing Council for Iraq through regulation 6 of 13 July 2003. Available 
@ http://www .iraqcoalition.org/regulations/index.html#Regulations 
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victory over women's empowerment239 . Appointing three women members in the 
Governing Council was publicized widely before one of them was killed in a deadly 
attack240. 
As the occupying power the CPA was under an obligation to restore and maintain 
public order and safety as well as respect the fundamental rights of the territory's 
inhabitants241 . Protecting women "against any attack on their honour, in particular 
against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault,,242 or introducing 
necessary amendments to the Penal code243 were also sectors that the CPA failed to 
implement for the betterment of women's rights. Throughout the duration of the CPA 
administration, controversial penal structure that allowed reduced punishments for honor 
crimes or allow male perpetrators of severe sexual crimes to escape punishment by 
marrying their victims remained in force244 exposing the failure of the administration's 
obligation to ensure basic human rights for women and girls. 
239 For example see "Climate of Fear: Sexual violence and abduction of women and girls in Baghdad" 
Human Rights Watch Report July 2003 Vol. 15, no 7 (E) retrieved from 
!illp:llhrw.org/reports/2003/iraq0703/; "Iraq: Decades of suffering, now women deserve better" retrieved 
from 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/iraq/document.do ?id=9E865CC4FD535B2880256F73005E404 7 on 
Feb 1 2007 and CPA official document "CPA accomplishments 2003-2004" retrieved at 
!illp://www.iragcoalition.org/pressreleases/20040628 histcn-ic review cpa.doc pages 51-55 
240 
UNlFEM Report. Page 4 
241 See Article 43 of Hague convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of war on Land and Article 
29 and 47 of Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949. 
242 Article 27 of the Geneva Convention in Time of war retrieved from the website of the Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights @ http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu3/b/92.htm on Feb 1 2007 
243 Article 67 of the same 
244 
HRW Report '03 n 34 p 19 
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Iraq Interim Government: 
A 37 member Interim Government took over Iraq's governance on June 30th when the 
CPA dissolved. The members, chosen through consultation among the CPA, IGC, United 
Nations and Iraqi people consisted of politicians, former IGC members, tribal leaders, 
exiles out of whom six were women. The TAL was the constitutional framework for this 
government, which was recognized as the sovereign authority for Iraq by the United 
Nations, Arab league, United States and several other countries. Interestingly the armed 
troops of the coalition did not leave raising speculations of a de facto control by the 
occupying forces. The Interim government did not take any specific measure to ensure 
safety and empowerment of women; neither did it overrule any discriminatory provision 
of the existing framework. 
Iraq Transitional Government: 
An elected Transitional government took power in Iraq on 3cd of May 2005 serving till 
20th May of 2006 only to transfer sovereignty of Iraq to a permanent structure of 
governance. This government operated according to the TAL and was entrusted with the 
responsibility of drafting a permanent constitution for new Iraq. The Constitutional 
drafting committee had six women members and the government itself did not have 
significant participation from women. The Constitution made women's rights subject to 
religious consent and rather than addressing previous regimes' discriminatory regulations 
encouraged Islamic ideology to decide on women's position in society. Iraqi women 
suffered a serious set back at the beginning of a new era; where even an autocratic 
98 
government could not undermine women's role III the society a democratic process 
stripped away potentials from them. 
All three bodies of the transitional authority failed to address the most important issues 
regarding women; political participation, education, health concerns, security needs to 
name a few. Despite calls from women's organizations within Iraq, exile Iraqis and 
international organizations women did not have any important role to play in the political 
process from the very beginning245. Women considered being the highest ranking in 
terms of empowerment within the Arab world suffered during the sanctions and remained 
significantly neglected in the rebuilding of a society. The De' Baathification requirement 
for the candidates for government positions and other civil affiliations may have played a 
negative role in women's participation in politics and other social advancement 
programs. Under the previous government, women's organizations operated as Baath 
party wings in various parts of the country to provide education and trainings to 
245 For example, in a report by Refugees International titled" Iraq: Focus on Women's needs" published in 
April '03 it is-mentioned that at the first post Saddam political meeting in Nasiriya only 4 exile women took 
part in a group of 123 attendees. The trend continued throughout other gatherings where future of Iraqi 
politics was being discussed. For more on this see http://www.interaction.org/newswire/detail.php?id=1570 
246 For example, 'General Federation of Iraqi women' was the most active women's organization with 1.5 
million members during Saddam and operated under Baath Party. see 
http://www .interaction.org/newswire/detail. php ?id= 1570 
99 
Recommendations 
1 Defining Peace for Women: What constitutes peace for women? Is it absence of 
war by foreign invaders or internal rivalry? In answering this, Donna Ramsey 
points finger at the right answer" The definition of peace as 'not war' ignores the 
high levels of domestic and societal violence suffered by women even in times not 
characterized by violent political conjlict or in the period immediately following a 
conjlict,,247. In Iraqi situation women are facing the aftermath of a deadly conflict 
both at horne and outside. Rapes, domestic violence, religious prejudice, 
unemployment and above all lack of security at every step have dominated Iraqi 
women's lives since the occupation claimed victory over previous repressive 
regime. Mere military presence may help reduce sectarian violence or civil war 
whatever we call it, but true peace for women will prevail when both the legal and 
social structure supporting equality will complement secure lives that can reach 
full potential. 
2 Political Participation: As discussed before women's voices must be heard in 
decision-making processes for a society to advance in the direction of gender 
equality. In order to achieve adequate participation from women in the political 
arena, countries have adopted different measures in post conflict situations. For 
example during post conflict rebuilding South Africa, Mozambique and Namibia 
247 Donna Ramsey Marshall, 'Women in war and peace: Grassroots peace building' USIP Peace works no 
24 August 2004 p 8 
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sought quota system whereas Timor-Leste concentrated on training women to 
participate effectively in official positions248 . Women in the Muslim societies 
have been less involved in politics because of the social stigma and lack of 
education. The picture outside the'Arab states may be different but today's Iraq is 
necessarily carrying the primary identity of an Islamic state where women have to 
deal with the realities of discrimination in many respects. The Afghanistan 
scenario may look awfully familiar to today's Iraq where the only female 
presidential candidate was prevented from delivering speeches at religious 
shrines249. Yet the rich culture of previous secular Iraq maybe revived through 
education and institutions for preparing Iraqi women to participate in 
governmental decision-making process. Even the liberal interpretation of Islamic 
rules as described by the Iraqi government in 2000 as part of the CEDA W 
implementation report may play a positive role regarding women's role in 
politics250 . In trying to move forward with this agenda the US influence may 
prove to be detrimental to the goal. US is one of the few countries in the world 
that has not ratified the CEDA W251 , does not support the affirmative action steps 
towards women's empowerment which is a salient feature of the treaty and has 
only 14% congressional representation of women in its national parliament252• 
Informed policy making, consultation with international, regional and local 
248 Marcia E Greenberg and Elaine Zuckerman, " The Gender Dimensions of Post Conflict 
Reconstructions: The challenges in Development Aid" WIDER Research Paper No 2006/62 p3. 
249 Masouda Jalal was the only female candidate and could not run a fruitful campaign because of the 
prejudices against her as a Muslim woman. For a general discussion on this, see Hilary Charlesworth, ' The 
missing voice: women and the war in Iraq' 7 Oregon Review ofInternational Law 14 2005. 
250 Reference to the CEDA W UN document: Islam awards equal rights to women in relation to education, 
divorce and political participation. 
25\ Which other countries are not parties to the CEDA W convention? 
252 Hilary p 14 
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interested bodies before taking actions and respecting relevant international 
documents may improve the situation for women in Iraq as well as the country to 
find stability in the post conflict scenari0253• 
3 Reviewing the Constitution: As the most important framework and Supreme law 
for a country, the Constitution dominates the legal system. The 2005 Constitution 
of Iraq guarantees women equality and numerous rights subject to Islamic law. 
Islamic law clearly discriminates against women in relation to family matters such 
as inheritance, marriage and divorce etc. Depending on the interpreting authority 
it may mean restricting women's access to judicial or leadership positions 
stretched into limiting simple everyday things like driving or traveling without 
male companions254. Despite promises made in the Bonn agreement in 2001 and 
equal rights subject to Islamic beliefs enshrined in the Constitution, Afghan 
women saw little improvement of their situation since the Taliban regime255.The 
Constitution must be reviewed and given a secular outlook rather than making it a 
compromise document with the religious groups. Reviewing the Constitution and 
making necessary amendments will open the door to abolish discrimination in the 
existing legaLsystem. Unfortunately many laws denying women's equal status in 
the Iraqi society has gone unnoticed during the Transitional administrations. It is 
necessary to revisit the legal system and address the issues of honor killings, 
253 Rwanda took effective steps to involve its women, 60% of total population after the ethnic cleansing, 
that resulted in 49% representation in its national parliament in 2003 making it the largest female 
representation in Parliament worldwide. N 43 Greenberg and Zuckerman. 
254 For example, Most of the Middle Eastern countries do not allow women to be judges or rulers as well as 
banning them from exercising voting rights, traveling or driving on their own. 
255 Hilary P 14 
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inheritance, marriage and divorce rights, traveling in and outside the country and 
many more provisions that are archaic on the face of them. Introducing new laws 
to benefit the underprivileged and distressed women may be another option to 
4 Taking women's experience in account: People experience events within the 
purview of their race, class, gender etc. Women's sufferings in times of war are 
not limited to physical or emotional abuse, many times they are forced to take 
over household responsibilities in the absence of male members without ever 
being exposed to such duties before. During post conflict nation building 
measures, women's experience in war must be given due attention to prescribe 
reconstruction effort. In most cases women's different experiences of war are not 
taken into account in drafting peace agreements, post conflict reconstruction 
efforts, humanitarian aid distribution or even in the day-to-day governance 
scenario257 • Just as women constitute a significant number in Iraqi society today, 
their voices and accounts must be given serious consideration in dealing with any 
issue in the post conflict society. 
5 Adopting UN mandated standards: Iraq had been a signatory of numerous 
international human rights treaties for decades258 that ensure women's human 
256 Followed by post conflict legal review, countries like Eritrea, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa and 
Uganda sought amendments to property rights whereas Chinese and Vietnamese governments introduced 
new laws banning employment discrimination based on gender. Greenberg and Zuckerman p 4-5 
257 .Donnap 8 
258 Iraq is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR), International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), International Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC) , International Convention against Torture (CAT), International Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (lCERD), International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of all Migrant workers and members of their families( ICPRMW) etc. 
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rights in the most basic sense. Iraq has also ratified CEDAW259, known as the bill 
of rights for women with reservations to granting women equal rights in personal 
aspects like marriage, divorce, spousal rights, nationality and all sectors regulated 
by religious law and to submitting to compulsory jurisdiction of the international 
court of justice (ICJ) in case of dispute. Though 185 UN member countries have 
signed the treaty, the highest number of reservations of all treaties makes it look 
almost like an excuse to get away with the agenda of equality of women. The 
treaty itself declares it impermissible to have reservations incompatible to the 
object and purpose of the treaty but merely puts the burden on states to challenge 
each other on this rather than declaring ratification with reservations void26o• Iraq 
maintains reservations to provisions that go to the heart of the convention and yet 
by declaring reservations to mandatory jurisdiction of the ICJ they escape the 
questioning of any state party. It is not surprising that during the CPA, Iraqi 
Governing Councilor even the Iraq Interim Government questions of 
withdrawing reservations did not come up since the leading force of the coalition, 
the USA never ratified the treaty after signing it in 1980. Unfortunately during the 
elected transitional authority the issue became more distant than ever because of 
the rise of religious power in the government. Now it is very unlikely that 
discrimination suffered by women with the excuse of Islam will be removed from 
Iraqi society soon. 
259 Iraq became a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) on 13 th August 1986 with reservations to Article 2(f, g), Article 9 (Para 1&2), Article 
16 and Article 29 (Para 1). 
260 Article 28 Para 2 of CEDA W adopts the impermissibility principle of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of the Treaties but leave them on state parties to challenge before the ICI. Reservation on mandatory 
jurisdiction of the ICI makes the mechanism cripple. 
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Both the occupying powers and transitional administrations failed to confirm 
to the standards of SC resolution 1325. Inclusion of women in decision making 
process for preventing, managing and resolving conflict261 ; voluntary financial, 
technical and logistical support for gender sensitive training efforts262, respect 
international humanitarian laws in times of conflict263 , adopt measures to end 
impunity and seek justice for genocide, war crimes including sexual violence against 
women and children264 -almost all of the binding provisions of the UN resolution 
have been ignored by the authorities. The transitional authorities also missed the 
opportunity to sign the statute of International Criminal Court (ICC), a gender 
sensitive human rights instrument that can answer some women's grievances during 
armed conflict. As has been mentioned " while other human rights instruments have 
mechanisms to deal only with violations by states, the ICC represents new 
possibilities for the international enforcement of human rights as it has the 
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals directly,,265, the ICC might have addressed 
sexual violence against women by the coalition forces or various ethnic groups. To 
right the wrongs of the transitional administrators Iraq's elected government may still 
become a state party to the treaty and recognize the need for protecting women's 
human rights at its best. 
261 SC Res. 1325 Para 1 
262 SC Res. 1325 Para 7 
263 SC Res. 1325 Para 9 
264 SC Res. 1325 Para 11 
265 Zakia Afrin and Amy Schwartz, " A human rights instrument that works for women: ICC as a tool for 
gender justice" in Wilson, Sengupta and Evans edited "Defending our dreams: global feminist voices for a 




A world that was convinced of "Women's empowerment and their full 
participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in 
the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement 
of equality, development and peace,,266 stood by as Iraqi society traveled backwards and 
adopted primitive measures for the women. The civil war, western domination and 
regional power dynamics have dominated the discussion of Iraq since the transitional 
administration handed over power to an elected government. The damaging policies of 
the interim governments have exited the discussion table and apart from few insistent 
human rights groups, Iraqi women's plight are not considered as important issue any 
more. 
From the beginning of this conflict, women were excluded as decision makers 
both in the coalition forces and Iraq. The only woman leader consulted during the 
coalition forming was Megowati Sukarnoputri and she was discredited as 'unreliable and 
erratic' because of her doubts about participating267• Referring to the coalition forces as 
"boys only club" Professor Charlesworth finds deep connection among all the "war 
mangers" including the US and Iraq as they exclude women from foreign policy 
. making268 . This under representation of women in deciding to launch an armed attack and 
misrepresentation by the media throughout the conflict where Iraqi women were depicted 
266 Para 13 of Beijing Declaration on Fourth World Conference on Women, "Action for Equality, 
Development and Peace" held on Beijing China September, 1995 retrieved from 
http://www.un.org!womenwat\,hldawlbeijinglbeijingdeclaration.html on February 6, 2007. 
267 Hilary Charlesworth, "The Missing Voice: Women and the War in Iraq" 7 Oregon .Review of 
international Law 2005 p 9 
268 Id 
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as victims of Saddam Hussein's oppressive regime followed by the silence about 
grievances during the transitional authority. As civil war escalates in Iraq, women 
disappear from the focus of the international community as they do from the streets of a 
free country. During the Saddam regime, they were persecuted solely based on political 
beliefs while awarded the right to education, work and a secular environment; in the 
democratic Iraq, they have been reduced to bear identity of Muslim women first before 
everything else. Is democracy worth it? Where is the accountability of the transitional 
governments who proactively chose the mechanisms that's minimizing the potentials of 
Iraqi women? 
We can only hope that the elected government will confmn to international 




Post conflict Justice 
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Introduction: 
It was just like another video from the extremists showing beheading of human 
beings lives on camera. Or it may have been a replica of the episode of Roman Empire 
when crowds enjoyed people being eaten alive by beasts in the coliseum. Instead the 
hanging of Saddam Hussein was an act of a special tribunal and elected government. On 
6 am Iraqi time December 30 2006, when Muslims in many parts of the world were 
celebrating the most important holiday of their faith Eid ul FItr269 , The Iraqi President 
was humiliated in front of the world and hanged. For many, this is the picture of post 
conflict justice in Iraq. I beg to defer. The final moments of Saddam Hussein are in no 
way representative of an otherwise impressive effort. 
In the endeavor to create democracy based on the notion of 'Rule of Law', 
perhaps the most daunting task of the transitional authority in Iraq had been the one of 
administering justice. The traditional definition of justice as discussed by Plato270 can be 
stretched in the setting of a post conflict situation. Paul Van Zyl, the executive secretary 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa solicits a very broad 
definition of justice as moving 
" ... beyond focusing purely on the conduct of perpetrators, to include the needs of 
victims and the imperative to reform state institutions to ensure that human rights abuses 
does not recur,,271. 
269 Popularly known as Eid, this is the most significant Muslim festival that is celebrated once a year after a 
month long fast known as Ramadan. 
270 In his 'The Republic' Plato discusses the notion of justice through conversation between Socrates and 
his interlocutors. Plato's own arguments may be summarized to mean justice as the task of society 
according to one's natural abilities. 
271 For Paul van zyl's analysis 0 f the Velasquez Rodriguez judgment at 4 Iner-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser.C) 1988 
defining justice see Unfinished Business: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Contribution to 
Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa in Bassiouni edited Post-Conflict Justice p 745-746 
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This definition can be meant to understand two aspects of justice, 
a. Retributive and restorative justice leading to peaceful future. 272 
b. Repairing and enhancing the judicial system. 
In a post conflict situation, the second approach is usually given less attention273. And 
the first aspect is criticized by many scholars as part of the ongoing debate that evolves 
around the notion whether seeking justice in a post conflict situation is impediment to 
peace!274In case of Iraq, however, the expectation of retributive justice was undisputed 
among the population. At the same time, the role of occupiers required compliance with 
international obligation to restore law and order, which translated into restoring and 
enhancing the judicial system. Thus in the post conflict situation in Iraq, justice 
necessarily meant holding Saddam's government liable for their atrocities against Iraqi 
citizens over the period of 35 years and reconstructing the judicial system while 
introducing the aspect of independence of jUdiciary. 
In this chapter I analyze the TA's approach to post conflict justice in Iraq and their 
initiatives. Describing the actions of the authority I advance to answer three questions; 
first, did the statute of the special tribunal meet international standards? Second, did the 
trial of Saddam Hussein serve to satisfy goals post conflict justice? Third, did· the T A 
272 Retributive justice seeks to inflict punishment on the offenders for violations of law whereas restorative 
justice puts major emphasis on the harm committed to human relationships and aims to achieving social 
harmony in the aftermath of a corrtlict. Restorative justice may include Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions. 
273 As Cherif Bassiouni observed, " major western powers find it more polittcally congruent to their 
interests to establish ad-hoc post-conflict justice systems which are essentially focused on the past and 
without much regard for justice capacity building of national systems" p xvii, Cherif Bassiouni edited Post-
Conflict Justice, Introduction, Transnational Publishers Inc. Ardsley, New York 2002 
274 For a detailed description see Neil J Kritz, Progress and Humility: The ongoing Search for Post-Conflict 
Justice in Bassiouni edited Post-Conflict justice 2002. 
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actions for reconstructing the justice system comply with its mandate under international 
law? 
Establishing the special Tribunal for prosecuting Saddam 
"In the short span of ten years between 1992 and 2002, the values of 
international criminal justice have taken hold as an essential component of the 
international legal order,,275 
Truly the world has come a long way from the days of Nuremberg trial276, the first 
international criminal tribunal of its kind, which was criticized for its partiality and 
attitudes towards the victors. The establishment of ICTY 277 and ICTR 278 in the 1990s not 
only supported criminal liability for atrocities committed towards citizens by their own 
governments but also integrated the rules of fair trials, rights of the accused, 
compensation for the victims and many other progressive features in international legal 
order279. The ICC treaty280, however, elevated international criminal law to a new high 
standard when it came into existence in 2002. Quoted as the first gender sensitive 
legislation in international law, the ICC has strengthened the concept of international 
275 CherifBassiouni edited Post-Conflict Justice, Introduction p xvi, Transnational Publishers Inc. Ardsley, 
New York 2002 
276 Nuremberg Trial 
277 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the UN 
through SC Res. 827 on May 25 1991 to prosecute the perpetrators ofthe Yugoslav war in 1991. For more 
information on the Court see http://www.un.org/icty/ 
278 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by the UN through SC Res.955 of 
November 8, 1994 to prosecute the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. For more information 
on the Court, see http://69.94.11.53/ 
279For example, Both the ICTY and ICTR provide broad definitions of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, rape and other sexual assaults. 
280 The international Criminal Court, a permanent tribunal to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and crimes of aggression was created by an international treaty in 2002 . Independent of the 
UN, the current member of this court is 104. For more information on the Court see http://www.icc-cpi.intl 
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responsibility for domestic affairs of governments. The trend continues today with 
several tribunals set up to address post conflict justice issues281 • 
In this backdrop, it was only natural that Iraq's fallen government had to face 
special tribunal kind justice for the killings of its' own citizens. The first issue before the 
transitional authority was to choose the right forum for it. Among the choices were an 
ICTY type international tribunal, an East Timor type combination of national and 
international tribunal and an Iraqi tribunal created solely for the purposes of trying 
international crimes without any international influence. 
Despite expectations of an international criminal tribunal from the NGO 
communities, the Transitional authority favored an Iraqi tribunae82• The US 
administration reportedly preferred the local institution for the Iraqi people to feel more 
in charge of the events. Besides, anything less than the death penalty for Saddam might 
not have been acceptable to the people and yet impossible under international 
standards. 283 Tom Parker, the Head of CPA's crimes against humanity unit noted that 
after verifying the interest level for different types of tribunals, idea of a national tribunal 
was preferred by the authorities284• He also argued that after a brutal- sanctions regime, 
281 Consider the case of Sierra Leone. After a ten year long bloody civil war the government of Sierra 
Leone in agreement with the UN SC Res. 1315 of 2000 set up the Special Court for Sierra Leone that 
combined both international and domestic legal traditions to prosecute serious violation of international 
humanitarian law. See http://www.sc-sl.org/. 
282 See Bassiouni CherifM, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: An appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal in 38 
Cornell Int'l L. 1. 328-368 (2005) for a detailed discussion on the process of choosing to establish an Iraqi 
tribunal as observed by the author in the capacity of director of International Human Rights Law Institute's 
reconstruction of legal education program funded by the USAID in Iraq. 
283 Id P 344 
284 According to Tom Parker, as early as April 2003, OHRTJ began to reach out to Iraqi legal community 
and local human rights groups. By August 2003 report titled 'Iraqi Voices' from International Centre for 
112 
there was little interest on any UN involvement among the people. He failed to answer, 
however, why a court set up with the blessings of an occupier will be more acceptable 
than a recognized world institution. 
The proposal for the tribunal initiated from CPA allies and the Governing 
Council. The Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) that carried out the infamous trial of Saddam 
Hussein first came into existence as the Iraqi Special Tribunal (1ST) in December 10, 
2003. The CPA authorized the statute of 1ST promulgated by the Governing Council to 
'to try Iraqi nationals or residents of Iraq accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes or violations of certain Iraqi law' 285. Before being revoked and replaced by 
the national assembly of the Transitional Government with IHT in August 2005, the 1ST 
was set to utilize a combination of international and domestic criminal laws. The added 
emphasis on Iraqi domestic law is the main difference between the two. 
The IHT has jurisdiction over Iraqi citizens and residents accused of genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity between July 1968 and May 2003 as defined by 
the ICC treaty286. The IHT also declares jurisdiction over various crimes punishable 
under Iraqi criminal law287 . The inclusion of offences mentioned in the 1958 Iraqi penal 
code, which lack transparent definitions, raised concerns of being abused for political 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and Human Rights Centre (HRC) @ UC Berkeley, claimed overwhelmed 
support for a national tribunal to try Saddam. For a detailed discussion see Tom Parker, Prosecuting 
Saddam: The CPA and the Evolution ofthe Iraqi Special Tribunal @ 38 Cornell Int'l. L. J. 2005 
285 CPA Order 48 
286 Article 1, 11, 12 and 13 of the IHT 
287 Article 14 of the IHT 
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purposes288. The trial is to be regulated by the Iraqi criminal procedure, which derived its 
roots from civil legal traditions. According to the rules, an investigative judge collects all 
evidence, witness testimonies to use in the trial proceedings289. 
There are five judges in the trial chamber who decide on the appearances of the 
witnesses and questions they answer290. After being presented with the documents 
collected by the investigative judge, witness testimonies and prosecution and defense 
arguments trial judges deliver a verdict and a written opinion on the case. The verdict 
may be appealed before the Appeals chamber of the lliT that consist of nine judges 
including a President of the Tribunae91 . According to the statute judges, prosecutors, 
principle defense lawyer of the accused and all staff members of the SICT must be Iraqi 
nationals292. Non-Iraqi international law experts may be appointed in advisory role to 
assist judges and prosecutors in matters of international legal issues293 
The lliT grants impressive set of rights to the accused including equality before 
the law, presumption of innocence until proven guilty and a fair trial. Armed with 
international criminal law elements and promise of a fair trial, the lliT must be hailed as 
an exemplary domestic institution to try war crimes and like of government entities. The 
Saddam trial generated a lot of interest among international legal experts who waited 
keenly to witness the advancement of international criminal law in a domestic forum. 
288 In its October 16, 2005 briefing paper on The Former Iraqi Government on trial Human Rights Watch 
mentions crimes mentioned in Article 14 as 'political offenses and of a breadth and vagueness that makes 
them susceptible to politicized interpretation and application' 
289 Iraqi code of Criminal Procedure, Para 51-129 cross posted from HRW paper n 19 
290 Article 4.1 of IHT 
291 Article 4.2 of IHT 
292 Article 28, Article 22.4 of IHT 
293 Article 9.2, Article 10.9, Article 11.7 of IHT 
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Trial of Saddam Hussein 
Saddam Hussein's government was infamous for systematic killing of political 
dissidents. It is estimated that between 1968 and 2003, Iraqi government was responsible 
for the disappearances of 500,000 Iraqis294. 
The first case in front of the tribunal was Dujali case, where Saddam and other 
members of his regime were accused of killing 148 Shias in Dujali in 1982. Among the 
much-criticized Saddam trial were its legitimacy, fair trial, and capital punishment and 
execution issues. 
The legitimacy of the previous 1ST was harshly criticized by Bassiouni, a leading 
expert in the field on international criminal law. Mentioning the CPA's illegal invasion of 
Iraq he quoted 
No nonns or precedents exist in international law for an occupying power, the 
legitimacy of which is in doubt, to establish an exceptional national criminal tribunaz295• 
He predicted that as soon as the tribunal is repromulgated by a national legislative 
authority the legitimacy problem might be solved. It can be argued that the IHT is indeed 
promulgated by the elected national assembly, thus perfectly legitimate in the legal sense. 
This seems to be problematic as the election of the national assembly was administered 
during a iJeriod dominated by the CPA and the occupation. During its Appellate Chamber 
opinion, the IHT tried to answer the question of legitimacy as put forth by the accused by 
294 Bassiouni, Cornell p 330 
295 M CherifBassiouni, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: An appraisal of the Iraqi Special Tribunal 38 Cornell 
Int'l. LJ 359 (2005) 
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pointing out that this court existed as a step taken by the elected government whom 78% 
of Iraqi population supported in the election296 . Yet, the tribunal as one of the initiatives 
of the transitional government is most likely to always have the legitimacy stigma with it. 
Apart from the execution of the death penalty, it was criticized from two different 
aspects. First, the retention of death penalty contradicting a well-established rule of 
international law is questionable. It has been mentioned that despite CPA's dissatisfaction 
with the move, the Governing Council and later on the Interim administration insisted on 
retaining the capital punishment consistent with the existing penal code of 1969 in Iraq. 
Tom parker also argued the decision as a prerogative of the sovereign. Though it is 
tempting to believe in the superiority of the sovereign, this argument can not be given 
weight as it would justify all the human rights advocated by international law states avoid 
in the name of sovereignty297. 
Second, according to a view the death penalty was carried out in violation of the 
Iraqi code of criminal procedure, which allows additional 30 days to the convicted after 
the first appeal to request to correct errors in the judgment298 . In a rebuttal, Professor 
Scharf pointed out that provision of the tribunal requiring execution within 30 days of the 
296 Appellate Chamber Opinion ofIHT, December 26 2006 
297 For example states do not ratify ICCPR, CEDA Wetc. 
298 Professor Kevin Jon Heller argues that according to Paragraph 266 of the Iraqi Code of Criminal 
Procedure "the convicted person ... may request the correction of a legal error in the decision issued by the 
Court of Cassation, provided the request is submitted within 30 days, counted from the date a convicted, 
imprisoned or detained person is notified of the Court of Cassation decision" which means after the 
Appeals Chamber rejected Saddam's plea, he had another thirty days to ask the court to correct its legal 
errors. As Rule 66 of the IHT Rules of Evidence and Procedure explicitly requires the judgment to be in 
accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, executing Saddam before the lapse of thirty days violated 
the IHT procedure. For more on his argument see Grotian Moment Blog , Dujali Issue #46 @ 
http://law .case.edu/saddamtrial/ 
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Appeals chamber decision prevailed over any domestic law as it was a special court 
independent of the domestic court system299. 
Another criticism of the court draws on the sovereignty issue again. The visible 
involvement of the CPA authorities and US officials afterwards met with the argument 
that the tribunal could not act without their influence. Bassiouni argues that the visible 
role of the US was due to the fact that experts from US DO], who went in March 2004 to 
gather evidence to be used in the trial and to train the judges and prosecutors of the 
tribunal, did not have adequate knowledge of Iraqi legal system let alone the legal culture 
of the region30o. Whatever the reason may have been, the US involvement continued till 
the end of the trial damaging the notion of independence of the court. 
Besides few international legal experts, Human rights organizations kept a close 
watch on the Dujali trial. Fierce critic of the invasion of Iraq, these entities have sought 
greater UN role in prosecuting Saddam Hussein or at least a court independent of US 
influence30I . Human Rights Watch reported that the US neither follow a transparent 
process of consulting Iraqis nor assess Iraqi attitudes about justice and accountability302. 
Multiple requests from HRW and other human rights organization to comment on the 
draft were turned down. In a report titled 'Iraq: Dujali Trial Fundamentally Flawed' 
299 Professor Michael P. Scharf further mentioned, "This was an important approach as the IHT Statute was 
written to import the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and there 
were many provisions of the Iraqi Criminal Procedural Law of 1971 that were not consistent with those 
rights. The drafters thus intended the provisions ofthe IHT Statute to control." See Grotian Moment Blog , 
Dujali Issue #46 @ http:inaw.case.eduisaddamtriaV 
300 Bassiouni p 346 
301 Two of the most influential NGO's worldwide Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
302 The Former Iraqi Government on Trial, A Human Rights Watch briefing paper, October 16,2005 
retrieved from http://hrw.orglbackgrounder/mena/iraq1005/ (Last visited April 16, 2007) 
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released on November 20 2006, It also argued that the trial had enough serious 
procedural and administrative flaws to render it unfair and requested overturning of the 
verdict303 
Calling the trial deeply 'flawed and unfair' Amnesty International's Middle East and 
North Africa Director quoted 
"[Saddam Hussein's] overthrow opened the opportunity to restore the basic right [to a 
fair trial] and, at the same time, to ensure, fairly, accountability for the crimes of the 
past. It is an opportunity missed and made worse by the imposition of the death 
penalty ,,304 
Amnesty also voiced concerns about Saddam Hussein being denied right to 
defense attorney for the first year of the trial, assassination of three defense lawyers in the 
process, resignation of a judge on ground of partiality of the proceedings and overall 
political interference of the US with the whole process.305 
The IHT promises fair trial for the accused. As a state party to the ICCPR, the 
notion of fair trial entails a handful of rights to Iraqis including right to an impartial 
tribunal and adequate time for the preparation of defense306. Media around the world has 
reported throughout the trial about the killings of defense lawyers, boycott of the trial by 
them and open proclamations of the judges about the guilt of the accused well before the 
303 In the 97 page report, HRW reports procedural flaws in the trial including: 
• Regular failure to disclose key evidence, including exculpatory evidence, to the defense in 
advance 
• Violations of the defendants' basic fair trial right to confront witnesses against them 
• Lapses of judicial denreanor that undermined the apparent impartiality of the presiding judge; and 
• Important gaps in evidence that undermine the persuasiveness of the prosecution case, and put in 
doubt whether all the elements of the crimes charged were established. 
View the full report @ http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11120/iragI4589.htm 
304 See Amnesty International's press release on November 52006 ' Amnesty International deplores death 
sentences in Saddam Hussein trial' @ http://news.amnesty.orgiindexlENGMDE140372006 
305 N35 
306 Article 14 (1), Article 14 (3)(a)-(g) 
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verdict was delivered. The mode of execution further strengthened the claim of an unfair 
process of the Dujali trial. 
Apart from the practice of the fair trial provision, in theory the tribunal met 
international standard for holding a fair trial307• Dujali trial had a public hearing by an 
independent tribunal where Saddam Hussein exercised the right to retain defense 
counsels and call witnesses. Saddam Hussein was found guilty after all the evidences 
were considered and witnesses testified to that effect and his punishment was consistent 
with the tribunal rules as well as the common practice of the country. The fact that 
Saddam Hussein was brought to trial without being arbitrarily detained or executed is a 
triumph for the notion of rule of law. The handling of the trial may have been 
unsatisfactory to human rights standards in today's civilized world but it falls short of an 
unfair trial. 
Repairing the Justice system 
"The effective reconstruction of the justice sector requires a coherent approach that 
places equal emphasis on all its elements: police, prosecution, judiciary, and the 
. I ,,308 correctwna system 
This comment of an expert involved in the reconstruction of East Timor and 
Kosovo communicates the huge responsibility that the transitional authority faced in Iraq. 
During political negotiations in a post conflict environment, regular criminal activities do 
not necessarily cease. In case of Iraq there has been a significant escalation of looting, 
307 According to the UDHR(Article 10, 11), ICCPR(Article 14, 15)( and ECHR (Article 6), the basic 
components of fair trial include fair and public hearing in an independent tribunal, presumption of 
innocence, right to defense counsel etc. 
308 Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions 
in Kosovo and East Timor 95 Am. J. Int'l. L (46-93) 2001 P 48 
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vandalizing, robbery etc. The risk of loosing valuable documents of the government or 
proof of abuses of the previous administration is also high. A working criminal justice 
system was thus a priority from any point of view. 
One of the pillars of criminal justice system is policing. In the beginning of 
occupation, the coalition forces began policing for the courts without knowing anything 
about the legal system. Among their obstacles was lack of Arabic language skill, which 
prevented them from collecting any information from the arrested individuals309. Also the 
differences on the procedures made it almost impossible for the CPA to administer 
policing functions properly. As one of the members of Judicial Reconstruction Assistance 
Team (JRAT), a team created for assisting the CPA with reconstruction of criminal courts 
in Baghdad commented, 
"As far as the criminal justice system III Iraq, in March 2003 we knew it was 
supposed to run according to a civil law system based upon a French model codified by 
the Iraqi Penal code of 1969 and that criminal procedure was pursuant to the Criminal 
Procedure Code of 1972. What we did not know was how these laws were in fact 
followed.,,310 To remedy many such functional problems, the CPA went about 
introducing changes in the system. Several political offenses were suspended together 
with numerous procedural changes311 . Lack of expertise in few staff members were 
309 Address by Captain Travis Hall given at the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law's 
conference of April 16, 2004, "From Autocracy to Democracy: The Effort to Establish Market 
Democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan" published in Ga. J. Int'l & Compo L. 157-169 (2004-2005) 
310 Id P 159 
311 CPA Order 7 of9 June 2003 suspended many political offenses as well as capital punishment while 
Memo no 3 amended the code of Criminal Procedure to allow rights to accused previously unavailable 
under Iraqi law. For example, right against self incrimination, right to remain silent, right to be represented 
by an attorney etc were introduced in Iraqi legal system. See CPAlORD/9 June 2003/07 and CPAlMEMl27 
June 2004/03 @ http://www jraqcoalition.orgiregulations/index.html#Regulations 
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tackled by a three-tier approach in UNTAET. Mandatory week long training prior to 
appointments, ongoing trainings and monitoring through an international team of 
The challenges of reconstructing the judicial system of a conflict ruined country are 
also limitless. A similar scenario is found in testimony from East Timorese team of 
reconstruction 
"UNTAET staff members will never be able to forget the panorama of devastation 
that awaited them upon their arrival in East Timor: most public and many private 
buildings ruined and smoldering in the midst of what had once been towns and villages, 
now all but abandoned by their former inhabitants, cut off from transport and 
.. d 1 k' "l ,,313 commUnlcatwn, an ac mg a governmenta superstructure. 
One of the first priorities of that mission was to appoint judges and prosecutors who 
are free from controversies. Consisting of three East Timorese and two international 
experts led by an East Timorese of high moral ground a Transitional Judicial Service 
Commission appointed candidates with necessary expertise and political acceptance 
among the people314 .In the absence of a working broadcasting system, The UNTEAT 
staff dropped leaflets over the territory to invite applications from the population. The 
Iraqi reconstruction approach had been very different from any other similar cases 
involving reconstruction. The differences in-attitude may have been the result of a unclear 
mandate. 
312 NIl p55-56 
313 NIl P 50 
314 NIl P 53 
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Sharing his experience as CPA senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice John C. 
Williamson in his drew a comparison between the mandate under UNMIK and Iraq 
transitional authority315. In the case of UNMIK justice agenda, justice and police powers 
were reserved to the United Nations, management and control of the justice system was 
firmly within the capacity of the international community, much like in the UNTAET. In 
the Iraqi situation, the mandate was very unclear but to fill the power vacuum created by 
the fleeing of senior government officials, CPA exercised full control over the system 
rather than planned advisory role. 
Under the same mandate, the T A went about introducing changes in the legal 
education system of Iraq. 316They identified programs including improving the 
infrastructure of and materials in libraries, law school curriculum that has been 
unchanged for thirty years, and organizing conferences about recent legal subjects and 
fourth introducing clinical legal education. Rather than concentrating on the immediate 
need, CPA went about changing the basic structure again. 
Conclusion: 
Considering the difficult environment on ground and cultural challenges faced by the T A 
at the beginning of its reconstruction effort, it must be hailed as a praiseworthy effort. 
315 Establishing rule of law in post conflict Iraq: Rebuilding the Justice System @ 33 Ga. 1. Int'l. & Compo 
L. 229-244 (2004-2005), 
316 In his Article Haider Ala Hamoudi, Toward a Rule Of Law Society in Iraq: Introducing Clinical 
Legal Education into Iraqi Law Schools @ 23 Berkeley 1. Int'l. L 112-136 2005 mentions that he went to 
Baghdad as a part of a team of educators sent by De Paul University's International Human Rights Law 
Institute (IHRLI) to reform and improve legal education. 
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Even with its shortcomings, the IHT can be considered as an important milestone for 
international criminal law. Though Saddam Hussein faced less than fair trial, his 
conviction is likely to serve as a deterrent for many abusive governments around the 
world. International and regional experts may have played an important role in the 
judicial reconstruction that was almost within the mandate. In this context I like to argue 
that 
1. The Iraqi tribunal met with international criminal prosecution standard: 
A combination of international criminal law and Iraqi domestic procedure, this tribunal 
may serve as a model for other countries willing to deal with past violations of 
international humanitarian law. Involving international and regional experts may have 
added to the legitimacy of the court. Abandoning the provision for capital punishment 
and allowing longer period for appeal etc are few issues that need to be revisited. The 
inherent problem of legitimacy of this court is precisely captured in the words of Adel 
Safty, 
"(The) Iraqi Governing Council has been appointed by the occupying power; it has 
not been elected by the people. In this sense, it cannot claim to be competent to render 
justice on behalf of the people of Iraq. Therefore, the criminal tribunal set up by the Iraqi 
Governing Council does not meet the test of "independence and impartiality,,317 
Whereas this court will have to carry the stigma even after being reestablished by 
the elected assembly for years to corne, other countries may use the same model as 
prerogative of sovereign power. 
317 Cross posted from Danielle Tarin, Prosecuting Saddam and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq 45 
Va. J. Int'l. L. 493 (2004-2005) 
123 
.s ....................................... ~ 
2. The Trial of Saddam Hussein deviated from the goal of post conflict justice: 
According to Bassiouni, post conflict justice includes " how the nation responds to the 
systematic violations of the previous repressive regime, how it deals with the regime's 
victims, and how it transforms yesterday's tragedies into lessons for tomorrow that will 
enhance future deterrence and prevention,,318. 
The motion to address the violations of Saddam government was followed by 
establishing a tribunal that drew from international criminal legal jurisprudence only to 
fall victim to partial conducts of individuals involved. It is unfortunate that despite 
potential to enhance social reconciliation and promote unity among Iraqi citizens, the trial 
of Saddam Hussein has served as an act of vengeance. Completely ignoring reparation for 
the victims it rather fuelled clashes between ethnic groups. Rather than address past 
wrongs, the trial created many of its own. Though it was a fair trial, the image of Saddam 
Hussein being taunted at his final moments is likely to stay in people's mind as the legacy 
of the tribunal. The trial failed to satisfy victims of the crimes as there was no initiative to 
address reparation or reconciliation issues. It also failed to offer justice to victims of 
Saddam's other cruel campaigns as he was hanged too soon without being held liable for 
all his atrocities. 
3. The TA acted within and beyond its authority: 
While reconstructing the Justice system, the TA acted within its authority as it did not 
modify any fundamental provisions of law previously existing in the country. Though it 
suspended few provisions and introduced many new ones, it stayed within the recognized 
318 N13 P 335 
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mandate. Introducing fundamental changes in the legal procedures, education and judicial 
accountability are moves ultimately focused on a better and independent system of 
judiciary. 
Neutral international assistance, focused trial and most of all, waiting for a duly 
elected government to set up the tribunal might have resulted in a better process for 
holding Saddam accountable. Iraq may have been benefited from community courts or 
informal dispute settlement forums as they have proved to be successful in many post 
conflict environments319. Truth commission and other reconciliation forums for victims 
both before the conflict and during the T A will serve the true purpose of post conflict 
justice in Iraq. 
319 See Jennifer Widner in Courts and Democracy in Post conflict Transitions: A Social scientist's 
Perspective on the African Case @ 95 Am. J. Int'l. L. 64-75 2001 for a discussion of various African cases 
in which the community courts played positive roles in rebuilding the society. 
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Chapter VI 




Throughout the dissertation, I have tried to identify and answer legal questions arising 
from the transitional authority in Iraq. In many instances, I stumbled upon a fact that 
could not directly be explained or justified by any existing provision. From the beginning 
of the invasion till the formation of an elected government experts argued over applicable 
legal provisions. More than once I could neither agree nor dissent from those; rather felt 
the need for another comprehensive rule. In this chapter, I briefly revisit the legal 
inquiries, list the contribution they may have made to the international legal 
jurisprudence and recommend development of international law to enrich future 
transitional phases of post conflict territories. 
Accountability for Violating Jus Cogens: 
After evaluating arguments both for and against the legality of use of force in Iraq, I 
reached a conclusion in the second chapter that the US led coalition forces' attack on Iraq 
was illegal and a violation of jus cogens. As a careful student of international law, I take 
into consideration the promise of maintaining international peace and security, the 
obligation to refrain from use of force unless mandated through a Security Council 
resolution or deemed necessary in conformity with the provisions of self defense. Though 
the UN Charter is clear on the prohibition or permitted use of force, it is quiet on the 
effect of a violation. The rule regarding the power of Security Council to take appropriate 
measure in case of a violation has always overlooked violations of its members by 
default. In case of the Iraq situation the Security Council was unable even to pass a 
resolution condemning the violation of this peremptory norm of international law let 
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alone suggesting any measure to hold the US and UK accountable. In contrast, Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 has met with adequate response from the Security Council 
.This lack of consistent practice in addressing violations of basic tenants of the UN 
Charter is a major flaw of international law today and needs sincere reexamination. 
Rethinking the Security Council: 
The Security Council is the most influential body in the world. Since the formation of the 
UN, the five permanent members and ten members for every two year term have been 
entrusted with the primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security. The veto 
power of the permanent members has kept this council from acting in many crises 
situation. While the members are virtually immune from any such measure their 
preferences for other countries also come in the way of holding them accountable32o• 
Besides this, the Security Council can be described as a less than democratic institution 
as it does not represent the world population at any manner. The permanent members 
reflect the reality of a post 1945 war rather than today. As democracy demands, the 
General Council consisting of all members of the UN should have deciding power over 
the Security Council. Inclusion of Latin American and African representatives may also 
make the Security Council more democratic than its present form. The veto power must 
be removed to avoid stalemate in conflict situations. In its current form, the Security 
Council has become a platform for justifying military actions, economic sanctions and 
peacekeeping operations in developing countries for violations of international norms 
while overlooking similar violations of the permanent members or their allies. 
320 For example, due to US position in Israeli -Palestinian conflict, the Security Council has had no 
significant role in mitigating or resolving that conflict since 1967. For more on this see Security Council 
page of Global Policy Forum http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/gensc.htm. 
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Unfortunately the amendment allowing more countries membership to the Security 
Council and abolish the veto power, must be passed by the Council itself. Though it 
seems very unlikely at this point, for an effective UN this change must take place within. 
Introducing framework for Post Conflict Transitional Governance: 
As I discussed in the first chapter, the UN has been involved in administering post 
conflict territories very recently. The increasing numbers of internal conflicts together 
with UN interventions in many cases demand a comprehensive framework by which 
governance of the post conflict territories can be carried out. The UN already has 
representatives, legal and operational experts from different parts of the world who may 
be appointed to this effect. From the Iraqi case, it is apparent that regional expertise is 
especially helpful during nation building; the CPA and its reconstruction effort have 
suffered because of the lack of language and cultural skills among the common people of 
Iraq. The UN with its multinational experts can remove this flaw without much difficulty. 
Another important matter in this regard is the acceptability of the UN among nations 
which may act as a catalyst for restoring law and order situation. 
There are arguments suggesting the occupation law to become part of transitional 
period regulations and removing obstacles to make it more flexible in terms of 
introducing new laws321 . In this argument the commentator ignores the fact that UN 
Resolutions and laws meant for violating parties do not carry the same weight. Whereas 
UN presence is welcomed around the world, an occupying force struggles to justify its 
authority in the occupied country. Calling UN intervention, which may very well be a 
321 Breit H McGurk, Revisiting the Law of Nation Building: Iraq in Transition 45 Va. 1. Int'l. L 2004-2005 
(451-463) 
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result of popular demand similar as occupation undermines the sovereign consent 
principle. Rather the trusteeship council of the UN seems to be a better institution to take 
over this new phenomenon. Its experience of governing previous colonies until their 
independence armed with regional and international experts, this suspended body may be 
turned into the new transitional authority Council. Through this Council the UN will be 
able to provide post conflict governance and security to affected regions while evaluating 
their needs on a case by case basis. Up-to-date information on almost all sectors of 
country and available resources necessary for governance put the UN on an advantageous 
position for nation building responsibilities. 
Revisiting Post conflict justice mechanisms: 
Through the establishment of the tribunal, the transitional authority in Iraq has 
contributed significantly in the development of international criminal jurisprudence for 
post conflict territories. The Iraqi High Tribunal (llIT) tried individuals for international 
crimes following national criminal procedures. Despite the inclusion of adequate fair trial 
guarantees, this tribunal has been criticized for retention of death penalty and biased trial. 
The combination of llIT structure, ICTY and ICTR model of victims and reparation unit 
and ICC's gender sensitivity will offer satisfying justice for victims of conflict. The most 
important aspect of such a system is that it does not require submitting to foreign or 
international jurisdiction; rather remains within the sovereign power. It also serves as an 
example of holding governments or individuals liable for past atrocities since such a 
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court, set up on ad hoc basis will not limit responsibility to any specific period like the 
ICC322. 
Making women matter: 
Until recently international legal presence hardly included women in a decision making 
capacity. Within the UN, there were no women judges in the ICJ, only a few women 
were chosen as the highest executives of UN organs and fewer women joined as the 
representatives of their countries. Similar situation exists in the leadership of countries 
and in their parliaments. This scenario began to change with the passage of the statute of 
ICC, where specific measures have been suggested to include women in all the positions 
of the Court. In 2006 The General Assembly elected its first woman President323 after 
1969 and the ICJ appointed its first female judge who went on to become President of the 
Court324. The Security Council has mandated countries to include women in decision 
making in all aspect of peace processes325• In case of Iraq conflict, women have largely 
been invisible in the decision making with the exception of US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice. The TAL and permanent constitution drafted during the transitional 
authority did not warrant gender perspective in decision making other than providing 
safeguard against discrimination on the basis of sex. International law has long ignored 
the question of women's political participation nationally and internationally. Despite 
passing of the 1325 resolution, states' did not pay much attention to it. The lack of 
322'fhe ICC currently considers cases that happened on or after July 1 2002. 
323 H.E. Sheikha Haya Rashed Al KhaIifa was elected President ofthe sixty-first session of the General 
Assembly on 8 June 2006 
324 Rosalyn Higgins of the UK has been a judge of the ICJ since 1995 and was elected President in 2006 
325 SC/RES/1325 (2000) calls for inclusion of women in all decision making levels in relation to 
prevention, resolution and management of conflict, protection of and respect for the human rights of 
women and girls in conflict situations, gender training of all peace keeping personnel, formation of gender 
units and inclusion of gender perspective for all post conflict reconstruction. 
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monitoring or reporting mechanism and timetable to present progress made the resolution 
more like a declaration without compulsory responsibility. The UN must take this issue 
seriously and provide the world with better measures to safeguard women's interest and 
secure their political participation at all levels of the government. 
Conclusion 
The events in Iraq opened a door for discussion on the effectiveness of international law . 
Experts and students of international law are taking this opportunity to study its strengths 
and weaknesses resulting in recommendations to improve the body of law. The 
unfortunate subject of this case study, however, will have to live with the consequences 
of the experiment. The unplanned nation building exercise is taking its toll on Iraqi 
citizens, a complete account of which is still to unfold. The results of this invasion and 
events afterwards will be felt in the country and in the region for years, if not decades to 
come. The recent launch of the International Compact for Iraq326 as a joint initiative of 
the Iraqi government and the UN may help to stabilize the country. The international 
community must come up with a political solution for Iraq, not just promises of 
reconstruction. The lesson from this case is simple; there is no alternative for 
international cooperation in today's world. To make that effective, international law must 
provide the basic framework for all legal actions. 
326 UN Sponsored International Compact for Iraq is a five year national plan being launched in May 2007 
where the SC permanent members, the UN, 08, OIC, The Arab League, Egypt, Bahrain and neighboring 
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